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ABSTRACT
For many legal futurists, attorneys' work is a prime target for automation.
They view the legal practice of most businesses as algorithmic: data (such as
facts) are transformed into outputs (agreements or litigation stances) via appli-
cation of set rules (the law). These technophiles promote substituting com-
puter code for contracts and descriptions of facts now written by humans.
They point to early successes in legal automation as proof of concept. For
example, TurboTax has helped millions of Americans file taxes, and algo-
rithms have taken over certain aspects of stock trading. Corporate efforts to
"formalize legal code" may bring new efficiencies in areas of practice charac-
terized by both legal and factual clarity.
Legal automation, however, can also elide or exclude important human
values, necessary improvisations, and irreducibly deliberative governance.
Due process depends on narratively intelligible communication from persons
and for persons that are not reducible to software. Language is constitutive of
these aspects of law. To preserve accountability and a humane legal order,
these reasons must be expressed in language by a responsible person. This
basic requirement for legitimacy limits legal automation in several contexts,
including corporate compliance, property recordation, and contracting. A ro-
bust and ethical legal profession respects the flexibility and subtlety of legal
language as a prerequisite for a just and accountable social order. It ensures a
rule of persons, not machines.
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INTRODUCTION
Will law become a subdivision of computer science? The idea
might seem far-fetched now, given attorneys' distinctive professional
role as crafters and maintainers of social order. The history of the pro-
fessions, however, is one of jurisdictional turf battles, as rival elites
claim the right to solve certain problems or fill certain social roles.'
More recently, the spread of automation to white-collar work has
prompted futurists to predict that artificial intelligence will complete
many tasks now performed by lawyers-or replace them entirely.2
There are some realms of legal practice where algorithms, a
building block of artificial intelligence, have already displaced legal
workers. Automated document review is a staple of discovery now.
Additionally, a worker is far more likely to use TurboTax than to visit
a lawyer or accountant to prepare annual returns for the Internal Rev-
enue Service ("IRS"). Lawmakers could eventually draft tax statutes
in the form of computer code, eliminating the interpretative step that
TurboTax's lawyers and engineers must take as they translate statu-
tory requirements into their software. 3
1 See generally ANDREw ABBOr, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS (1988).
2 See, e.g., Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurispru-
dence of Behaviorism, 68 U. TORONTO L.J. 63, 80 (2018) [hereinafter Pasquale & Cashwell,
Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviorism]; Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell,
Four Futures of Legal Automation, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 26, 28 (2015).
3 See Sarah B. Lawsky, Formalizing the Code, 70 TAX L. REv. 377, 379 (2017).
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However, both lawmakers and regulators should be cautious as
they attempt to code legal obligations into software. While computer
code and human language both enable forms of communication, the
affordances offered by each are distinct and, in many respects, mutu-
ally exclusive. Code seeks to eliminate the forms of ambiguity and
flexibility characteristic of much language, including legal language.4
Just as quests to replace all standards with rules have failed, so too will
most efforts to rewrite legal rules as code.
To be sure, technology is already assisting civil lawyers in their
traditional roles as advocates and advisors and will continue to do so
in the future.5 However, can it replace them entirely? For many futur-
ists who project industrial trends onto the profession of law, the an-
swer is a resounding yes. 6 Legal futurists predict that software will not
only help lawyers find the cases relevant to their briefs but will write
documents themselves.7 Some predict a "legal singularity," which "will
arrive when the accumulation of a massive amount of data and dra-
matically improved methods of inference make legal uncertainty ob-
solete." 8 For many journalists, the arguments are compelling and
support a surfeit of stories on the "end of lawyers" and the "death of
Big Law."
Legal futurists build on the work of legal software vendors who
tend to dismiss ordinary practice as riddled with inefficiency, often in
order to market their wares as far better by comparison.10 Both groups
4 See DAVID GOLUMBIA, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF COMPUTATION 78 (2009).
5 This Article focuses on the role of technology in civil legal practice. Calls for the techno-
logical displacement of legal work in the criminal context have been far more muted than they
have been in the civil space. For critical perspectives on substitutive automation of criminal-law-
enforcement personnel, see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Sus-
picion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 350-51 (2015), and Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing Police Robots, 64
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 516, 519 (2016).
6 See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine
Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3041, 3041-42 (2013).
7 See RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SussKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONs 202
(2015) (describing computerized drafting of legal and other documents).
8 Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTo L.J.
443, 445 (2016); see also Benjamin Alarie et al., Law in the Future, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 423,
427-28 (2016).
9 See, e.g., Tom Meltzer, Robot Doctors, Online Lawyers and Automated Architects: the
Future of the Professions?, GUARDIAN (June 15, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/jun/15/robot-doctors-online-lawyers-automated-architects-future-professions-
jobs-technology [https://perma.cc/73Q4-WVZA].
10 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law's Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2011) (promoting disruption of so-called "legacy providers" of legal services
by information technology-intensive corporations).
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prescribe the automation of legal services as a way to advance access
to justice, reduce legal costs, and promote the rule of law." Legal fu-
turists characterize these developments as a democratization of law
and an empowerment of ordinary individuals.1 2 They tap into both
conservative promarket rhetoric against the professions and left-wing
distrust of elites.13 Legal futurism is presented as more than merely a
dictate of an increasingly competitive market for professional services.
Rather, it is praised as normatively desirable, a "new form of law"
that "will emerge to provide all of the benefits of both rules and stan-
dards without the costs of either."14
Legal futurists tend to present the reduction of legal obligations
to computer code as a positive evolutionary step toward the realiza-
tion of the rule of law.15 Human attorneys can err about facts or mis-
represent precedent; human judges may be influenced by extraneous
factors or bias.16 Automators of law thus tend to see their work as one
more step toward elevating the legal system above the fallibility of any
particular person within it.'7 One literal way of achieving the oft-
quoted ideal, "a rule of law, not of men," is to dispense altogether
with persons implementing or interpreting law.'8 For example, an un-
appealable fine imposed by a red-light camera and automatically de-
11 See SussKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 7, at 66-67.
12 See, e.g., Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction-or-How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62
EMORY L.J. 909, 939-41 (2013) (discussing predictive technologies used in patent litigation).
13 For conservative rhetoric, see John 0. McGinnis, Machines v. Lawyers, Crry J. (2014),
https://www.city-journal.org/html/machines-v-lawyers-13639.html [https://perma.cc/KZL9-SCPE]
(claiming that the "innovators driving our computational revolution ... [are] likely to shape a
politics more friendly to markets"). For left-wing suspicion of professionals as elites, see MAGALI
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALIsM 3 (1977) (claiming that legal services are
"almost exclusively reserved to the small literate elites on whom the specialists depend for their
existence").
14 Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J.
1401, 1403 (2017).
15 See Anthony D'Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277,
1300-01 (1977) (presenting computerization as a path to a more "determinable legal system").
16 See, e.g., Ozkan Eren & Naci Mocan, Abstract, Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22611, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w22611.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9F6-BPWB] (finding that unexpected losses in "football games
played by a prominent college team in the state . . . increase disposition (sentence) lengths as-
signed by judges during the week following the game"). This Article discusses how sophisticated
legal systems should address these kinds of biases. See infra Part III.B.
17 See J.C. Smith, Machine Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277,
278 (1998) ("From the perspective of the lawyer, we have the concept of the rule of law, as
contrasted with the rule of persons; thus, in some sense separating the legal conceptual process
from the human.").
18 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 781 (1989)
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ducted from a motorist's bank account would amount to pure
automation of law, unaffected by any particular decisionmaker's bias.
Of course, this approach merely shifts personal responsibility
from attorneys, regulators, and judges to those coding their would-be
replacements. Until some "master algorithm" can code its own prog-
eny, human beings will always be responsible for legal determina-
tions. 19 In order for legal automation to truly respect rule of law
principles, the adage "a rule of law, not of men" must be comple-
mented by a new commitment-to a "rule of persons, not ma-
chines." 2 0  Without attributing algorithmic judgments and
interpretations to particular persons and holding them responsible for
explaining those judgments, legal automation will undermine basic
principles of accountability.
This Article describes how language is often constitutive of law
and legal judgments. Language does not merely represent one of
many forms the law can take but is the only form capable of realizing
foundational rule of law principles. Recognition of this power of lan-
guage should guide the future of legal automation. This recognition
also balances the emerging discourse of legal futurists by articulating
what is lost when society cedes more aspects of the authoritative artic-
ulation of rights and duties to computational processes.
Substitutive legal automation is designed to replace, rather than
merely aid, attorneys. 2 1 Part I explores three areas where substitutive
legal automation has become widespread: software that now prepares
millions of Americans' taxes, firms like LegalZoom that draft wills
and contracts based on computerized interactions with customers, and
chatbots like DoNotPay that guide users through challenges to park-
(explaining that "[tihe ideal of 'the rule of law, not of men' calls upon us to strive to ensure that
our law itself will rule (govern) us, not the wishes of powerful individuals" (footnote omitted)).
19 The leading academic treatment of the possibility of such automation is found in PEDRO
DOMINGOs, THE MASTER ALGORITHM 12-20 (2015) (discussing how integration of five schools
of machine learning may lead to rapid advances in computing).
20 The shift from "men" to "persons" reflects Radin's rationale for making a similar move
in her classic article on the rule of law:
For obvious reasons, because I am considering the Rule of Law in today's context, I
shall rephrase the ideal as 'the rule of law, not of individuals.' Yet we must not
forget that when the ideal developed, and during most of its long history, it was
inconceivable that any individuals who were not 'men' could be a part of political
life.
Radin, supra note 18, at 781 n.1.
21 In contrast, complementary legal automation, like search engines or word processing
software, merely assists attorneys. Cf WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, EcoNoMIcs
120 (13th ed. 2016) (describing complements and substitutes as fundamental economic catego-
ries to indicate the effect of one good or service on the value of others).
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ing tickets. Each of these legal technologies democratizes access to
information. They can, however, also mislead users about their rights
and duties while foreclosing opportunities for compensation for this
harm via restrictive terms of service. The language of law is both
richer and more treacherous than these simple programs present.
Despite these and similar problems with current, modest efforts
to substitute technology for attorneys, both computer scientists and
legal scholars have promoted even more ambitious programs of sub-
stitutive automation. Part II describes three of these initiatives and
their shortcomings. In each case, legal problems that appear at first
merely to require a simple translation of language into computer code
turn out to hinge on far more complex social and political relation-
ships. The flexibility and openness of language enables the type of
improvisation necessary to maintain those relationships. Nevertheless,
many legal futurists still promote a vision of self-executing law embed-
ded in code as the ultimate goal of legal technology.
Part III proposes an alternate approach: technology as a tool to
complement attorneys' skills, rather than substitute for them. Drawing
on the distinction between artificial intelligence and intelligence aug-
mentation common in research on human-computer interaction, it
promotes principles for complementary (rather than substitutive) le-
gal automation. A complementary approach not only promises to
serve clients better, but also to realize rule-of-law values more fully.
Law is a complex and variegated domain that includes services
ranging from the humblest administrative processes to the highest
stakes of imprisonment and freedom. So, it should come as no surprise
that the use of software and robots to draft, interpret, and enforce
laws has varying degrees of acceptability, depending on the context.
Obtaining a fishing license with a chatbot makes sense, and we should
expect to see more and better examples of such "civic tech" in coming
years.22 On the other hand, even the most enthusiastic boosters of le-
gal automation do not want to see prison sentences handed down by
robot judges or juries. More difficult questions arise between these
two extremes, discussed in the next Part.
These apps fill a gap in the legal-services market. In general, the
worse a human performs a job presently, the better a robot looks in
22 Civic tech can be defined as the use of technology by governments to promote positive
interactions among citizens themselves, and between citizens and their state. MAYUR PATEL ET
AL., THE EMERGENCE OF Civic TECH 6-7 (2013); see also Michael Halberstam, Beyond Trans-
parency: Rethinking Election Reform from an Open Government Perspective, 38 SEATTLE U. L.
REv. 1007, 1009-10 (2015) (discussing Open Government movement to increase transparency).
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comparison. For the average American citizen, quotidian interactions
with legal authorities can range from the annoying to the cringe-in-
ducing. Car registration, income tax calculation, application for finan-
cial aid-each can easily descend into confusing labyrinths of texts,
punctuated with unsatisfactory interactions with rude and overworked
bureaucrats. Software and app makers are now trying to ease that bur-
den with innovative approaches to serving customers. Each of these
interventions, however, has unexpected consequences which limit
their value.
I. CURRENT APPLICATIONS OF SuBsTrUTIvE LEGAL
TECHNOLOGY
The most promising versions of legal automation are targeted at
people who need and deserve-but cannot afford-an attorney. For
example, in many low-income neighborhoods, thousands of children
have juvenile records for crimes like selling marijuana or vandalism. 23
States recognize that the resulting records should not haunt persons
after they become adults, and almost all have adopted some version of
a process called expungement to seal such records. 24 Attorneys can
usually arrange for an expungement relatively quickly, but not every-
one has access to a lawyer. Therefore, public interest attorneys and
technologists have developed apps like ExpungeMaryland (designed
for Maryland residents) to automate much of the process of seeking a
simple expungement. 25
Unfortunately, once legal questions become more complex than
resolving whether and when a criminal record eligible for expunge-
ment exists, software-based approaches can easily falter. This Section
explores the complexity of using computer code to translate require-
ments of legal code in ways understandable to laymen.
23 See Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 963, 967-68 (2013).
24 See Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 353, 356 (2014).
25 See Tyler Waldman, Why ExpungeMaryland.org is Helping People Erase Their Criminal
Records, TECHNICALLY BALTIMORE (July 25, 2014, 8:29 AM), http://technical.ly/baltimore/2014/
07/25/expungemaryland-expunge-erase-criminal-records-baltimore/ [https://perma.cc/84HX-
746Y]. On its website, the service is currently billed as a "free online tool" and provides next
steps, which may include working with a lawyer. EXPUNGEMARYLAND, http://www.expungemary
land.org/ [https://perma.cc/XUB5-KBPT].
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A. Automating Tax Preparation
At tax time, Americans have long used software programs to cal-
culate their income tax liability. TurboTax was established in the 1980s
and has become ever more dominant in the past few decades. 2 6 The
U.S. Internal Revenue Code is over 72,000 words; the IRS can gener-
ate hundreds or thousands of words of instructions for filling out sin-
gle lines of return forms.27 TurboTax translates the welter of tax law
into a series of questions. For users with simple returns, the software is
strikingly easy to use. For those with more complex ones, it can be
more trying-but is almost certainly easier to use than trying to figure
out one's liability alone.
For its customers, the days of filling out tax forms with paper and
pencil are over.28 TurboTax has saved U.S. taxpayers countless hours
in tax preparation time. The company's success, however, is not an
entirely positive story. It provides some early warning signs as other
forms of legal automation enter the limelight.
First, for most citizens, tax returns are simple. One of America's
leading tax experts, William Gale, has estimated that the government
could easily calculate the tax due from "non-itemizers," that is, people
who take a standard deduction rather than specifically claiming ex-
penditures like a mortgage-interest deduction or moving expenses.2 9
The IRS could base its annual bill on information already provided to
26 See Richard P. Weber, TurboTax, 86 J. AM. TAX'N Ass'N 86, 86 (1986) (reviewing the
software); Meg Miller, How Turbo Tax Used Design to Win the Tax Wars, FAST COMPANY (Mar.
30, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3056784/how-turbotax-used-design-to-win-the-tax-wars
[https://perma.cc/5C8Y-MEJE] (comparing TurboTax's sixty-percent market share to nine per-
cent for the next competitor).
27 See JEFFREY A. WINTERS, OLIGARCHY 223 (2011) (describing the complexity of the
code as an outgrowth of interest-group politics).
28 See IRS, FIuNG SEASON STATISTICS FOR WEEK ENDING DEC. 25, 2015, https://www.irs.
gov/uac/newsroom/filing-season-statistics-for-week-ending-december-25-2015 [https://perma.cc/
XPQ7-FCX9]. IRS statistics only show the breakdown for e-filed returns, which constitute
85.5% of all returns. Id. Of those, in 2015, 39% were self-prepared and 61% prepared by tax
professionals. Id. Of the paper returns submitted, there is no information about how many of
those were generated by software.
29 See William G. Gale, Remove the Return, in TOWARD TAX REFORM: RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA'S TASK FORCE 41-42 (2009) (estimating that 60 million filers are
non-itemizers); Liz Day, How the Maker of TurboTax Fought Free, Simple Tax Filing, PROPuB-
LICA (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-maker-of-turbotax-fought-free-
simple-tax-filing [https://perma.cc/VUQ5-S7JV] ("Advocates say tens of millions of taxpayers
could use such a system each year, saving them a collective $2 billion and 225 million hours in
prep costs and time, according to one estimate."); Austan Goolsbee, The Simple Return: Reduc-
ing America's Tax Burden Through Return-Free Filing, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2006), http://
www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2006/07/useconomics-goolsbee [https://perma.cc/BWM7-
LS88] (proposing a "Simple Return" for those who take standard deductions).
8 [Vol. 87:1
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it by employers and give individuals the choice to either accept that
tax or try filing their own returns.3 0 Gale and other advocates pressed
the IRS to offer this option to non-itemizers. 31 Sensing a threat to its
business model, TurboTax fought back.32 It spent millions of dollars
lobbying against the proposal, even stirring up so-called "grassroots"
opposition via a public relations firm.33 The legal automators beat
back the proposal, demonstrating that high-technology firms can have
a vested interest in keeping things complicated enough to assure
steady demand for their services.
The mere availability of software like TurboTax may have other
troubling effects on legislators. According to Lawrence Zelenak, when
tax returns were primarily done on paper, "Congress did not impose
income tax provisions of great computational complexity on large
numbers of taxpayers, in the belief that it was unreasonable to require
average taxpayers (or their paid preparers) to struggle with" such de-
tails.34 Zelenak argues that tax-return-preparation software eliminated
that "complexity constraint," freeing legislators to impose ever more
baroque provisions.3 5 Interacting provisions governing credits, deduc-
tions, exclusions, and the alternative minimum tax make the resulting
income tax a "black box" for many of those using software-and
nearly impossible to figure out for those who want to continue with
manual preparation.3 That evolution might be a positive one if legal
complexity clearly served positive social goals. But for Zelenak, the
opposite is the case; he believes the computationally complex provi-
sions of the tax code "generally constitute bad tax policy."3 7
Both TurboTax's lobbying and the rise of computational complex-
ity in the tax code embody an enduring problem in automation. Tech-
nologists cannot assume that computational solutions to one problem
30 See Gale, supra note 29, at 41-42.
31 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, § 2004, 112 Stat. 685, 726 (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to "develop proce-
dures for the implementation of a return-free tax system" by 2008); Gale, supra note 29, at
42-43.
32 See Day, supra note 29.
33 Liz Day, TurboTax Maker Linked to 'Grassroots' Campaign Against Free, Simple Tax
Filing, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/turbotax-maker-linked-
to-grassroots-campaign-against-free-simple-tax-filing [https://perma.cc/6X4L-3VH9].
34 Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L.
91, 91 (2010).
35 Id. at 93.
36 Id. at 91, 102, 118 ("As return preparation software gradually replaced the pencil, the
complexity constraint weakened and eventually disappeared. Congress has responded by impos-
ing unprecedented computational complexity on large numbers of taxpayers.").
37 Id. at 91, 118.
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will not affect the scope and nature of that problem. Instead, as tech-
nology enters fields, problems change as various parties seek to either
entrench or disrupt aspects of the present situation for their own ad-
vantage. In the above example, the legal automation firm (TurboTax)
helped entrench unnecessary returns, while the government made al-
ready-complex tax preparation even more difficult. While TurboTax
portrays itself as the taxpayer's inexpensive, efficient, robotic advo-
cate, it is also serving those in government who wish to complicate the
tax code.
B. Providing Forms
Founded in 2001, LegalZoom leads the field in providing person-
alized legal forms.3 By 2011, LegalZoom claimed to have served over
two million individuals with downloadable forms and internet-medi-
ated walk-throughs of questionnaires and flow charts related to their
legal problems. 39 LegalZoom does not claim to be offering a lawyer to
its users; rather, it claims to be offering "legal information" as a so-
phisticated series of forms and queries. 40
The firm has been popular, particularly for those looking to set
up companies. Paperwork can be complex, and LegalZoom condenses
what could be a lengthy series of meetings with attorneys into a three-
step process. 4 1 In many cases, there is a two-step process. First, the
program asks users to answer a series of questions. 42 Then,
LegalZoom employees review answers for "consistency and complete-
ness." 43 Once these workers have reviewed the answers given, the pro-
gram prints the form and sends it to the user, along with instructions
38 LEGALZoom.com, INc., AMENDMENT No. 1 To REGISTRATION STATEMENT (FoRM S-1)
1 (June 4, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286139/000104746912006446/
a2209713zs-la.htm [http://perma.cc/XAL5-WUVS].
39 Lauren Moxley, Note, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to
Reforming the Lawyer's Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV.
553, 557-58 (2015); see also Catherine J. Lanctot, Does Legalzoom Have First Amendment
Rights?: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20
TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REv. 255, 257 (2011); LEGALZoom, https://www.legalzoom.com/ [http://
perma.cc/FZJ7-DV53].
40 See Moxley, supra note 39, at 554 ("LegalZoom is able to keep costs low by producing
much of its work through automated generation and review by non-lawyers... . [I]t characterizes
its services as the dissemination of 'legal information,' which non-lawyers are permitted to do, as
opposed to the dispensation of 'legal advice,' which would constitute the unauthorized practice
of law ..... (footnotes omitted)).
41 See id. at 557.
42 Id.
43 Id. (citation omitted).
10 [Vol. 87:1
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on how to execute the necessary formalities for the document to have
legal effect.44
Whatever the qualifications of these employees, the question-
naire process itself can be partial or problematic. 4 5 As of 2015, one
could go through the estate-planning-questionnaire process without
any prompting about the special complexities raised by the savings
vehicle where many Americans' non-home assets are-employer-
sponsored retirement savings accounts. 4 6 In many cases, a will does
not control the distribution of those assets at their owner's death;
rather, that is the job of a document memorializing the account
owner's designation of beneficiaries. 47 This is not merely a speculative
concern. As the Wall Street Journal has reported, some family mem-
bers are surprised by the ultimate disposition of assets from 401(k)
plans and individual retirement accounts ("IRAs").48 "That's where
most of the wealth in America ends up," said a certified public ac-
countant, "[blut what most people don't realize is it's surrounded by
this complex labyrinth of rules." 49 Thus, "key questions are not asked,
people make mistakes, and many times it involves their life savings." 50
44 Id.
45 There is also widespread concern that LegalZoom, a leading form provider, engages in
the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1055 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (finding that LegalZoom prepares legal documents and "takes over" after
customers "answer a few simple online questions"); LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No.
11 CVS 15111, 2014 WL 1213242, at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2014) (allowing case alleging
LegalZoom engages in the unauthorized practice of law); Assurance of Discontinuance, In re
LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 10-2-02053-2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2010) (mandating "assurance
of discontinuance" of suspect activities); Wendy S. Goffe & Rochelle L. Haller, From Zoom to
Doom? Risks of Do-it-Yourself Estate Planning, 38 EsT. PLAN., Apr. 2011, at 27-28 (discussing
the risks of missing particular local law requirements); Pierce G. Hunter, Note, Constitutional
Law-Unauthorized Practice of Law: Driving Legal Business Without a License, LegalZoom,
Inc., and Campbell v. Asbury Automotive, Inc., 2011 Ark. 157, 381 S.W.3d 21, 36 U. ARK. Lrr-
TLE ROCK L. REV. 201, 202 (2014) (discussing that a fiduciary duty, and thus liability, attaches to
common business practice of charging a fee for completing standard legal documents). But see
Medlock v. LegalZoom.Com, Inc., No. 2012-208067, 2013 S.C. LEXIS 362, at *13 (Oct. 18, 2013)
(finding that LegalZoom's services "do not constitute the practice of law").
46 Screenshots of the questionnaire are on file with the author. For documentation of prev-
alence of retirement accounts, see Carolyn T. Geer, Investing in Funds: A Monthly Analysis-
Family Feuds: The Battles over Retirement Accounts-Who's in Line to Get Your Account or
That of a Parent or Spouse-In Case of Death? You Could Be Surprised, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,
2011, at C9 ("IRAs and 401(k)s now account for roughly 60% of the assets of U.S. households






THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Presumably, once this issue is brought to the attention of a bu-
reaucrat at a high enough level within LegalZoom, the software will
be amended to reflect the important role of beneficiary forums. The
firm cultivates user forums to ventilate such concerns. The work of
these forums is controversial. Internet boosters like Clay Shirky char-
acterize them as a form of charity or a new form of community build-
ing.51 Others call forum commenting a form of "shadow work"
creeping in to the experience of those who answer questions, and a
degradation of quality of service for those who, lacking real experi-
ence of a qualified accountant or tax lawyer, may have no sense of
what they are missing.52
Business experts offer plans on how to psychologically reward
contributors (since investors are wary of any fixed labor costs).
"Gamification" is one easy answer-offering answerers points and
publicly posting their ranking relative to other would-be helpers.53 For
Amazon's top reviewers, the system has brought microcelebrity sta-
tus. 5 4 For others, the rewards are less clear.55 But what should be obvi-
ous is the shifting role of artificial intelligence ("Al") in these
scenarios. TurboTax or LegalZoom forums are very often not answer-
ing tough legal questions. Rather, the key automation technology here
is a form of management which uses marketing and other tactics to
draw individuals to offer their "expertise" for free-and to encourage
users to rely on such "expertise" with no assurance it is correct.
C. Contesting Parking Tickets
Red-light cameras are one version of robotic law enforcement.
All that is necessary for the robot to enforce traffic law is a simple set
of rules declaring that any person who owns a car that passes under a
light when it is red shall be fined a certain amount and possibly lose
his or her license to operate the car.56 What if the owner wasn't the
51 See CLAY SHuny, COGNITVE SURPLUs 143-44, 155-59 (2010).
52 See, e.g., CRAIG LAMBERT, SHADow WomK 201-50 (2016) (discussing shadow work on
the internet, such as offering free information through customer reviews that may be monetized
through, for example, Zagat guides).
53 KEVIN WERBACH & DAN HUNTER, FOR THE WiN: How GAME THINKING CAN REVO-
LUTIONIZE YOUR BusINEss 2 (2012).
54 See, e.g., JOSEPH M. REAGLE, JR., READING THE CoMMENTs 54 (2015) (describing
super-reviewer Grady Harp).
55 See id. (describing the going rate for reviews as $5 to $20).
56 See Andrea M. Franklin, Police Powers for Sale: Red-Light Enforcement Sold to the
Foreign Bidder, 8 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 137, 172-73 (2012); Jeffrey A. Parness, Beyond Red
Light Enforcement Against the Guilty but Innocent: Local Regulations of Secondary Culprits, 47
WrLLAME-TTE L. REv. 259, 262 (2011); see also William D. Mercer, At the Intersection of Sover-
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person driving? Add in a facial-recognition subroutine and higher-res-
olution video cameras connected to the red-light camera. Advocates
of robotic law enforcement envision even finer-grained systems of so-
cial control embedded, ambiently, into roads, sidewalks, and other
features of daily life.57
Nevertheless, these steps toward the automation of traffic law
merit some skepticism. Consider, for example, the verification of med-
ical emergencies in the case of the parking-ticket-appeal app. If the
city simply accepts any appeal, bad actors may take advantage of the
app eventually. Parking authorities can order audits. In some areas,
like healthcare fraud, big data and predictive analytics have made it
much easier to expose cheaters.58 But the auditing process seems to
rely upon some form of human interaction and expertise.
For hardcore legal futurists, though, even audits could be auto-
mated. It is all a matter of piggybacking new technical systems on old
patterns of monitoring and data exchange. Many states already re-
quire versions of computerized physician order entry ("CPOE"); digi-
tal health records have become widespread. 59 Any given visit to a
doctor may generate a unique visit identifier or time-stamped barcode
that could, in turn, be deployed as verification in any number of sce-
narios: an excuse from work, a parking emergency, or a claim for in-
surance. The scope and intensity of automation crucially depends on
coordination among healthcare providers, employers, insurers, and
many other entities in developing machine-readable, verifiable
records of behavior that have some legal import.
Moreover, even a technical innovation as pedestrian as the red-
light camera has sparked both constitutional and legal challenges. For
example, one author has argued that the cameras violate fundamental
constitutional principles of due process and the right of defendants to
confront their accusers.60 These challenges have, so far, largely failed
in courts that are eager to accelerate the resolution of what they per-
eignty and Contract: Traffic Cameras and the Privatization of Law Enforcement Power, 43 U.
MEM. L. REV. 379, 403-08 (2012) (describing traffic-camera contracts and sovereignty of the
state).
57 Mireille Hildebrandt, A Vision of Ambient Law, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIEs 175,
187 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008) (describing pervasive monitoring and regu-
lation via landscapes and buildings saturated with sensors, processors, and actuators).
58 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SociuTY 150-53 (2015); Frank A. Pasquale,
Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health Care, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1661, 1676-77 (2014).
59 See Pasquale, Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health Care, supra note 58, at
1670-72 (discussing the use of electronic health records).
60 Joel 0. Christensen, Note, Wrong on Red: The Constitutional Case Against Red-Light
Cameras, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 443, 446 (2010).
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ceive to be relatively minor disputes.61 Nevertheless, public outrage
about red-light cameras has reversed their advance; there are fewer
red-light cameras in use today than there were in 2010.62
Is this outrage justifiable? For some civil rights advocates, the an-
swer is a resounding no. 6 3 Camera-driven enforcement can be less
likely to be racially biased than traffic stops by police officers.64 But
there is also ample evidence that algorithmic processes of sentencing
and risk assessment can be racially biased.65
Another set of problems arises in terms of the power dynamics of
this technology adoption. Automation like red-light cameras has been
characterized as a troubling form of state power-an unstoppable ma-
chine arrayed against ordinary citizens.66 For many believers in the
power of technology, however, the answer to problems caused by
technology is simple: more technology. If the city automates traffic
enforcement, then give citizens an application ("app") for their
smartphones to empower a quick and effective challenge when they
have been unfairly fined.
A chatbot developer claims that his DoNotPay app has success-
fully appealed 160,000 parking tickets (out of about 250,000 cases
where the app was used).67 The DoNotPay app guides individuals
61 See, e.g., Jimenez v. State, 246 So. 3d 219, 230-31 (Fla. 2018) (upholding statute allowing
state to contract with third-party vendor to provide red-light cameras).
62 See Charles Lane, Red Light Camera Use Declines After Public Outrage, NPR (May 23,
2016, 4:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/05/23/479207945/red-light-camera-use-declines-after-
public-outrage [https://perma.cc/QUB6-M4MY].
63 But see, e.g., Marty Katz, Frown, You're on Red-Light Camera!, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 11,
2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/11/automobiles/frown-you-re-on-red-light-camera.html
[https://perma.cclLD6G-3TM5] (describing the American Civil Liberties Union concern with
"mission creep" and use of data collected).
64 See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (2017)
(discussing how automation can reduce discrimination). See generally Robert J. Eger III et al.,
The Policy of Enforcement: Red Light Cameras and Racial Profiling, 18 POLICE Q. 397 (2015).
65 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REv. 803, 838 (2014) (describing the racial consequences of auto-
matically calculated sentencing risk scores having disparate impacts on minorities); Julia Angwin
et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-
bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/3ZU9-Q84D] (describing flawed
results of risk assessment algorithm).
66 See Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Privacy in an Era of Asymmetrical Social Control, in
BIG DATA, CRIME, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 32, 32-35 (Aleg Zavrtnik ed., 2018); Jathan Sadowski
& Frank Pasquale, The Spectrum of Control: A Social Theory of the Smart City, 20 FIRST MON-
DAY 1, 6-8 (2015).
67 Samuel Gibbs, Chatbot Lawyer Overturns 160,000 Parking Tickets in London and New
York, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2016, 6:07 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/
28/chatbot-ai-lawyer-donotpay-parking-tickets-london-new-york [https://perma.cc/Z5WT-
R8BK]; see also Kelly Phillips Erb, Are We Ready for Robot Lawyers?, PA. LAw. (May/June
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through potential appeals of parking tickets. 68 For drivers in New
York, the app suggests that a medical emergency can exempt a car
owner from a parking ticket.69 If a similar exemption governs red
lights, when there are no other automobiles in sight, we can envision
not merely the robotization of aspects of traffic and parking law but
also the complementary automation of appeals against violations.
The automation of such appeals is still in its early stages. It could
lead to the same dynamics now afflicting tax: a technology-enabled
turn toward complexity and micro-enforcement. The more apps like
DoNotPay become widely known, the more bad actors are likely to
misuse them and lie about the actual circumstances of their ticketing.
That will, in turn, motivate even more pervasive surveillance of city
streets to monitor the exact situation that led to the ticket in any given
case. Municipalities are already automating many other services; they
have replaced so-called "meter maids" with robotics and internet-of-
things ("loT") sensors that tend toward perfect enforcement of the
law.70
Citizens may be lulled into accepting such a state of affairs by
assuming that the same technological advances that aid law enforce-
ment will also help them combat unfair or unwise applications of laws.
Technologists are now beginning to claim that there is no difference
between their software and personal legal expertise. Journalists push
the DoNotPay app as a "chatbot lawyer,"71 and the DoNotPay first
page stated in 2016, "DoNotPay has launched the UK's first robot
lawyer as an experiment. It can talk to you, generate documents and
2016), http://bt.e-ditionsbyfry.com/article/Legal-Tech/2461447/298785/article.html [https://
perma.cc/8R8U-WSB6]. Often citizens who meticulously filled out the forms generated by the
chatbot were the ones who did the bulk of the work to reverse the tickets, but media accounts
tend to give credit to coders alone. See, e.g., id.
68 See Tim Cushing, Chatbot Helps Drivers Appeal over $4 Million in Bogus Parking Tick-
ets, TECHDIRT (July 1, 2016, 2:09 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160628/1716383 4 85 3 /
chatbot-helps-drivers-appeal-over-4-million-bogus-parking-tickets.shtml?threaded=true [https://
perma.cc/W8MH-VVET]; Danielle Furfaro, College Kid's Website Can Get You Out of Parking
Tickets, N.Y. PosT (June 28, 2016, 6:17 PM), https://nypost.com/2016/06/28/college-kids-website-
can-get-you-out-of-parking-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/645B-9CCJ].
69 See DoNOTPAY, https://www.donotpay.com/viewbot/596597cbe4dcd1001117el61
[https://perma.cc/A3P4-Q4CA].
70 For approaches to improving law enforcement via new technologies of monitoring, see
STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CIMwFORD, THE RESPONSIVE CITY: ENGAGING COMMUNITIES
THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE 122-24 (2014) (financial crime); cf. BETH SIMONE
NOVECK, SMART CITIZENS, SMARTER STATE 209-26 (2015) (discussing big data and crowdsourc-
ing of expertise for smarter governance).
71 Tim Eigo, Robots and the Lawyers Who Love Them, 52 ARiz. Arr'v, July/Aug. 2016, at
4.
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answer questions. It is just like a real lawyer, but is completely free
and doesn't charge any commission." 72 But a lawyer is obliged to offer
the best advice she can and to take responsibility for falling below a
certain standard of care.73 Unlike an ethically practicing attorney, Do-
NotPay has shifted the risk of error to its ostensible clients. 74 Indeed,
DoNotPay goes further; its users "agree to indemnify, defend and
hold harmless DoNotPay from any liability, loss, claim and expense,
including attorney's fees, related to [their] violation of [its terms of
use] or [their] use of the service and information provided at the
site."75 The magnanimity of DoNotPay's public relations campaign
ends here. Unlike a human professional who accepts consequences
when things go badly wrong, this "robot lawyer" does not merely re-
fuse to take responsibility, but holds the "client" responsible when its
proprietor is harmed by their interaction. App-driven legaltech that
eschews such basic duties is not a lawyer, robot or otherwise, no mat-
ter how much hype it attracts. 7 6
The prevalence of A/B testing in technology firms also militates
against the development of ethical-substitutive technology. Just as a
physician has a fiduciary duty to conscientiously divide treatment be-
tween clinical care and medical experimentation (with a very different
set of rules and obligations governing each), a lawyer cannot abide by
72 Julie Olmsted, A Teenager Wants to Replace Lawyers with Robots, LAWYERIST.COM
(Jan. 19, 2016) (citation omitted), https://lawyerist.com/a-teenager-wants-to-replace-lawyer-with-
robots/ [https://perma.cc/G8SB-S37F].
73 The American Bar Association's Rules of Professional Conduct provide that lawyers
cannot prospectively limit their liability with clients in fear of a malpractice action. In order to
make such a contract, the client must be represented by independent counsel and informed
about the consequences of such a contract. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr, r. 1.8(h)
(AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) ("A lawyer shall not: (1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the
lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in
making the agreement; or (2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepre-
sented client or former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seek-
ing and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in
connection therewith."); see also N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr: RULES AND COMMENTARY
r. 1.8(h) (NYCLA Ethics Inst. ed., 2011); Swift v. Choe, 674 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (App. Div. 1998).
74 See Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, DoNOTPAY, https://www.donotpay.com/terms/
[https://perma.ccl35MV-NN87] ("DoNotPay assumes no liability for any errors or omissions in
the information contained in the Service and expressly disclaims any responsibility to update this
information.").
75 Id.
76 One also wonders exactly how much DoNotPay adds to existing efforts to expand ac-
cess to law by firms when entities like Nolo have provided forms for years. See Dashka Slater,
Sue Yourself, LEGAL AFF. (Sept./Oct. 2003), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-Octo-
ber-2003/scene slater-sepoct03.msp [https://perma.cc/95XP-C7YP]. DoNotPay has provided
forms, while relying on users to apply rules (stated or implied in the forms) to the facts.
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rules of professional ethics if she (or software she has written) is test-
ing various legal strategies on clients without letting them know the
nature of the experimentation. These principles of human-subjects re-
search, while often primarily associated with the medical field, have
wider application. 7 7
II. PLANS FOR FUTURE SUBsTITUTIVE LEGAL AUTOMATION
The most widespread examples of substitutive legal automation
exist in the consumer sphere, in fields like tax, will preparation, and
traffic disputes. Even in these relatively sedate areas of practice, they
have raised serious ethical concerns about unintended consequences
and consumer protection. But on balance, substitutive legal automa-
tion in these fields may be a laudable phenomenon when the stakes of
a matter are low, and when the chances of mobilization of better alter-
natives are also minimal. Numerous studies document unmet legal
needs among those of low-to-middle socioeconomic status in the
United States.78 Software may be the only form of advice available to
many citizens and even many small businesses.
Early successes in consumer services have inspired a new genera-
tion of legal automators to push for businesses and governments to
standardize and computerize work once done by attorneys (or other
personnel who interpret and apply law).79 The promise here is less
77 See James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users, 13
COLO. TECH. L.J. 219, 262 (2015); Paul Litton & Franklin G. Miller, A Normative Justification
for Distinguishing the Ethics of Clinical Research from the Ethics of Medical Care, 33 J.L. MED.
& ETHIcs 566, 568 (2005); Julian J.Z. Polaris, Principles over Principals? How Innovation Affects
the Agency Relationship in Medical and Legal Practice, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETmIcs
296, 300 (2014).
78 See, e.g., Dion Chu, Matthew R. Greenfield & Peter Zuckerman, Measuring the Justice
Gap: Flaws in the Interstate Allocation of Civil Legal Services Funding and a Proposed Remedy,
33 PACE L. REv. 965, 965-66 (2013) ("Underscoring the extent of this 'justice gap,' the [Legal
Services Corporation ("LSC")] concluded in 2009 that: (i) 'for every client served by an LSC-
funded program,' one had to be turned away because of inadequate resources; (ii) fewer than
twenty percent ... of legal problems encountered by low-income people were addressed by a
lawyer; (iii) only one legal aid attorney was available for every 6415 low-income individuals (in
contrast, one private attorney was available for every 429 individuals above the LSC-eligible
income threshold); and, (iv) state courts were experiencing large increases in the number of
unrepresented litigants unable to afford a lawyer.") (quoting LEGAL SERVS. CORP., Docu-
MENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-
INCOME AMERICANS 1, 1-2 (2009), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/mar
ketresearchlPublicDocuments/JusticeGalnAmerica2009.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/46
PB-ZYEN]).
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"access to justice" than "reducing legal spending."80 Cost savings are a
powerful argument in an era of increasing global competition and de-
clining state revenues. But in many cases, the automation of legal ser-
vices hides the externalization of cost and risk to customers, citizens,
and business rivals. The immediate savings in personnel costs are
obvious; the long-term risks are probabilistic, but real. Already docu-
mented in extant legal-automation projects, these costs are also fore-
seeable in idealistic proposals to accelerate the robotization of law.
A. Requirements Extraction as Privacy Compliance
For legal futurists, legal processes are essentially algorithmic in
nature: data (the facts) are transformed into outputs (a judgment or
result) via application of set rules (the law).81 This model is easiest to
imagine in the realm of financial contracts. For example, a contract
may require someone to buy 100 shares of stock at $10 a share from a
counterparty if the price of gold falls below $800 an ounce. If both
parties can agree to an authoritative source of data on the price of
gold, a way to escrow the shares and the money needed to buy them,
and an automated way of enabling the transfer of ownership of the
shares once the gold price condition is triggered, the contract is effec-
tively automated.
Dividing transactions into dozens or hundreds of component
parts like this may seem like a tempting target for efficiency mavens.
The legal world, however, can become intractable once a bit more
complexity (such as jurisdictional or constitutional concerns, preemp-
tion doctrines, or statutory carve-outs) enters the picture. That is one
reason why so much energy is now directed toward legal technology
for business-to-business transactions.
For example, teams of programmers and attorneys led by Travis
Breaux at the computer science department of Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity have modeled the problem of compliance with privacy law as
one of inputs (data) and outputs (certain restrictions on the scope and
extent of data sharing permissible).8 2 Under federal health-privacy
80 See, e.g., Boosting Procurement Efficiency Through Automation, SYNERGIST.Io (June 29,
2018), https://synergist.io/procurement-automation/ [https://perma.cc/97MX-HZJ9] (automating
procurement led to "reduc[ing] legal spending in this area by 75%").
81 See David Howarth, Is Law a Humanity (or Is it More Like Engineering)?, 3 ARTS &
HUMAN. HIGHER EDUC. 9, 11-12 (2004). See generally DAVID HOWARTH, LAW As ENGINEERING
61-73 (2014).
82 See Travis D. Breaux et al., Towards Regulatory Compliance: Extracting Rights and Ob-
ligations to Align Requirements with Regulations, 14 IEEE INT'L REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING
CoNF. 49 (2006).
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law, a large hospital may enter into over five hundred business-associ-
ate agreements with firms ranging from credit card companies to
cloud vendors.83 These contracts are designed to specify restrictions on
the extent to which personal health information may be transferred
from the hospital, as a covered entity, to other entities.84
Breaux and his coauthors analyzed regulations and policies,
breaking them into constituent semantics (the meaning of particular
terms) and syntax (the legally prescribed relations among terms)."-
They program computers to generate compliance outputs for particu-
lar scenarios.86 For example, a patient's health record at her primary
care physician's office may indicate that the patient has diabetes.
Once that data about diabetes is in the relevant database, certain re-
strictions may be superimposed on it. The data may always be accessi-
ble to the patient herself or to other physicians seeking to treat the
patient.8 This data may only be used for marketing purposes if the
patient gives specific consent.88
To convert contracts and statutes into computer code, Breaux and
affiliated researchers have deployed semantic parameterization, "in
which rights and obligations from regulation texts are restated into
restricted natural language statements (RNLS), to describe discrete
activities."8 9 For example, a regulatory provision requiring that a
health care provider must "post the notice for an individual to read" is
divided into the subject of the requirement (the health care provider),
the action (post), the object (a notice specifying data policies), and a
83 See Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting Health Privacy in an Era of Big
Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 618 (2014) ("[L]arge health
systems ... can have as many as 20,000 business associates.").
84 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017) ("Protected health information means individually iden-
tifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is:
(i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or
maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information excludes individually
identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C.
1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer;
and (iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50 years." (emphasis
omitted)).
85 See Breaux et al., supra note 82, at 51.
86 See Travis D. Breaux & Calvin Powers, Early Studies in Acquiring Evidentiary, Reusable
Business Process Models for Legal Compliance, 6 IEEE INT'L CONF. ON INFO. TECH. 272,276
(2009).
87 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2017); 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2017).
88 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3) (2017); 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2017).
89 Breaux et al., supra note 82, at 51. They used this method on three datasets to include
their work on the privacy rules in HIPAA. Id.
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purpose (getting an individual to read the notice).90 That purpose has
a new set of atomic building blocks: the subject (an individual pa-
tient), an action (read), and an object (the notice).91
Such decomposition of legal requirements into their component
parts, coupled with rigorous definitions of the parts, is a valuable ped-
agogical and research tool. It promotes a careful parsing of legal terms
and raises interesting questions about the meaning of terms like
"read" and "notice" in a wide variety of settings. It is a helpful way of
structuring questions about what a regulation or statute states propo-
sitionally. Even a regulation as simple as this posting requirement,
however, raises further ambiguities about the meaning of the terms
involved. What exactly must be in the notice? When the law specifies
that the notice is "for an individual to read," does that create any obli-
gation on the provider to ensure reading actually occurs? How would
that be validated?
To be sure, questions like this do not paralyze the average com-
pliance staff at a hospital or ambulatory surgical center. Notices are
drafted, patients sign to indicate that they have read them, and medi-
cal care is delivered. But these notices are also tailored to different
settings. A notice in a setting with many English-as-a-second-language
speakers may only ideally reflect that community's concerns if it is
designed and presented in a way distinct from that dispensed in a
place without those demographic characteristics.92 A patient may re-
fuse to sign-what then? May the notice requirement be met by an
email sent before the patient's visit, or after? An algorithmic response
to each of these eventualities is imaginable and could be programmed
into a robotic registration kiosk.93 There is also a fair chance, however,
that a person who may resist signing will simply stand before an auto-
mated registration kiosk, helpless, before a person at the health care
provider assists them. What then?
90 Id. at 53; 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(c)(2)(iii) (2017) ("If the covered health care provider
maintains a physical service delivery site: .. . (B) [it must] [p]ost the notice in a clear and promi-
nent location where it is reasonable to expect individuals seeking service from the covered
health care provider to be able to read the notice .....
91 Cf Breaux et al., supra note 82, at 54.
92 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 74, 78
(2018) (discussing the importance of context in understanding and drafting privacy notices).
93 See Chia-Fang Chung et al., Implementation of a New Kiosk Technology for Blood Pres-
sure Management in a Family Medicine Clinic: From the WWAMI Region Practice and Research
Network, 29 J. AM. BD. FAM. MED. 620, 629 (2016); Bill Hartlove, Patient Check-in Kiosk Goes
Live at the Johns Hopkins Medical Laboratory @ White Marsh, JoHNs HOPKINS MED.: PATHOL-
OGY BLOG (Apr. 18, 2014), http://apps.pathology.jhu.edu/blogs/pathology/patient-check-in-kiosk
-goes-live-at-the-johns-hopkins-medical-laboratory-white-marsh [https://perma.cclP9EE-QR4Q].
[Vol. 87:120
A RULE OF PERSONS, NOT MACHINES
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HILPAA") is complicated enough that it is difficult to imagine how to
reduce all of it to software coding.94 But HIPAA is only one face of
health-privacy law, which also includes state-based common and statu-
tory law. Health-sector businesses now aspire to a multijurisdictional
analysis of legal requirements to ensure business compliance for pri-
vacy generally. 95 That would require incorporating, at a minimum, the
privacy restrictions of American states, the federal government, and
those of other governments where a firm may wish to transfer data.96
Breaux's team also addressed datasets, including "the 100 most
frequently occurring semistructured goals mined from over 100 pri-
vacy policies."97 The research trajectory is ambitious: Breaux and an-
other coauthor "plan to further validate this methodology, heuristics
and patterns within the context of financial regulations and aviation
standards to determine its applicability beyond healthcare." 98 Privacy
and cybersecurity requirements are a key target for such automation. 99
However, before cost-containing general counsel become too ex-
cited about the automation of compliance, they should recognize the
limits of this research. Breaux et al. concede that "[w]ithout further
validation, it is premature to automate that which is currently per-
formed manually." 10o Even more troublingly, they concede that "[t]he
role of constraints in identifying conflicts between rights and obliga-
tions must still be considered. Herein, we only identify trivial conflicts
by observing negation and type-similar values in semantic models."101
94 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
95 See, e.g., Global Health Care Compliance, ROPES & GRAY, https://www.ropesgray.com/
en/Global-Health-Care-Compliance [https://perma.cc/7JVJ-JUSJ].
96 See generally David G. Gordon & Travis D. Breaux, Reconciling Multi-Jurisdictional
Legal Requirements: A Case Study in Requirements Water Marking, IEEE INr'L REQUIREMENTS
ENGINEERING CONF. (2012).
97 Breaux et al., supra note 82, at 51; see also Jaspreet Bhatia et al., Mining Privacy Goals
from Privacy Policies Using Hybridized Task Recomposition, 25 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING & METHODOLOGY 22:1 (2016).
98 Breaux et al., supra note 82, at 57.
99 A 2012 study shows a framework called "requirements water marking" which is meant
for business analysts to "align and reconcile requirements from multiple jurisdictions (municipal-
ities, provinces, nations)." Gordon & Breaux, supra note 96, at 1, 5; see also Travis Breaux &
Ashwini Rao, Formal Analysis of Privacy Requirements Specifications for Multi-Tier Applica-
tions, 21 IEEE INT'L REQUIREMENTs ENGINEERING CONF. 14 (2013) (providing methods for
analyzing multiple privacy regulations to assist in identifying and resolving conflicts).
100 Breaux et al., supra note 82, at 57.
101 Id. Only minor progress has been made on this problem. See, e.g., Travis D. Breaux et
al., Eddy, a Formal Language for Specifying and Analyzing Data Flow Specifications for Con-
flicting Privacy Requirements, 19 REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERTNG J. 281, 281 (2014) (describing
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Such conflicts are common in information law. For example, the same
firm may be under duties of nonspoliation and preservation (which
require data to be maintained) and duties of data minimization (which
may include the need to respect customers' or business partners' de-
mands to delete data).102 Careful management of such conflicts is
bread-and-butter work for attorneys, and requires human judgment
about the balance of risks involved in any data-retention strategy.1 03
B. Smart Contracts as Linguistic Robots
A DVD may only be licensed for play in the United States and
Europe, and then be "coded" so it can only play in those regions and
not others. 104 Were a person playing the DVD for the user, he might
demand a copy of the DVD's terms of use and receipt to see if it was
authorized for playing in a given area. Computers need such a term
translated into a language they can "understand," or, in another char-
acterization, the legal terms embedded in the DVD (and the environ-
ment of the program that runs it) must trigger predictable reactions
from the technology that encounters them.10 5
These programs lead to predictable frustrations for users. Reac-
tions to digital rights management software range from annoyance to
outrage; online forums are full of advice on how to defeat the DVD-
methodology to "detect conflicting privacy requirements within a policy and enable the tracing
of data flows within these policies").
102 See Tania Abbas, Note, U.S. Preservation Requirements and EU Data Protection:
Headed for Collision?, 36 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 261-62 (2013); see also Ken-
neth J. Withers, Risk Aversion, Risk Management, and the "Overpreservation" Problem in Elec-
tronic Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 537, 538 (2013).
103 To be sure, there will continue to be advances in document management and transfer.
See, e.g., NAVEX GLOBAL, CEDARS-SINAI HEALTH SYSTEM CURES THE POLICY MANAGEMENT
ILLS (2016), http://www.navexglobal.comlen-us/resources/case-studies/cedars-sinai-health-sys
tem-cures-policy-management-ills [https://perma.cc/WBP5-HCJ6] (describing sophisticated doc-
ument and record management system). Even when document and record management systems
advance, however, attorneys and compliance experts are still reviewing and analyzing them. Id.
at 2 (describing "[a]utomated notification to users with reading, reviewing and approval
responsibilities").
104 See Peter K. Yu, Region Codes and the Territorial Mess, 30 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
187, 191 (2012) ("Designed as technological protection measures, DVD region codes direct ma-
chines to allow access to the protected content only if the product was coded to be played in the
authorized geographic region. The playback control mechanism initiated by these region codes
can be found on both DVD players and computers containing DVD-ROM drives.").
105 See Hiram Mel6ndez-Juarbe, DRM Interoperability, 15 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 181,
197-98 (2009) (assessing the challenges of creating a DRM system that could encode the com-
plexity of fair use doctrine); Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629,
632 (2012) (describing automatic implementation of contracts); Harry Surden, Machine Learning
and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 106 (2014) (describing limits of automatic or even "learned"
responses by computational compliance systems).
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zoning software. 106 But to the extent laws articulate simple binaries of
easily programmable desiderata, this automation may still have a
bright future. For example, if the copyright law of a given country
suddenly forbids the playing of certain media in computers, a Legal
Requirements Specification Language ("LRSL") may be hard coded
into devices, enabling a centralized authority to simply flip a switch to
automate compliance.107 Such tools can also reformulate certain laws
and present them as compliance requirements to a layperson.os
Parties may also be more willing to enter into contracts if they
can be assured of some degree of "automatic," code-based enforce-
ment.109 When it comes to simple supply chain management, there is
some real promise for smart contracts. 10 Imagine, for instance, a ship
coming into port with fifty tons of sugar in containers. Assuming that
sensors capable of identifying sugar and assaying its weight and qual-
ity are deployed, an automated exchange could be devised. In some
sense, virtually anyone who shops on Amazon experiences a similarly
106 See, e.g., Tony Smith, How to Hack Tesco's DVD Player-Register Readers Write, REG-
ISTER (Feb. 22, 2000, 2:15 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/02/22/how-tohack-tescos_
dvd/ [https://perma.cclQ8Q2-TUKM].
107 Another one of Breaux's studies promotes the LRSL to cross-reference regulations in
different jurisdictions or to cross-reference within a regulation. See Gordon & Breaux, supra
note 96, at 4. This work is supposed to serve as proof of concept for flexible and evolving coding
of legal requirements to ensure that if a given regulation changes, products are accordingly up-
dated to maintain legal compliance.
108 A 2007 study provided information on Breaux's CERNO tool, which similarly relied on
phrase heuristics for analyzing policy and regulations to generate legal compliance outputs. See
Nadzeya Kiyavitskaya Nicola Zeni et al., Extracting Rights and Obligations from Regulations:
Toward a Tool-Supported Process, 22 IEEE/ACM INT'L CONF. ON AUTOMATED SOrrwARE EN-
GINEERING 429-30 (2007), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/-breaux/publications/nkiyavitskaya-ase07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/iPA6-SPRW]. Another study discusses using the Frame-Based Requirements
Analysis Method ("FBRAM") for analyzing federal regulations to ensure software legal compli-
ance, evidence due diligence, and good faith to comply. See Travis D. Breaux, Exercising Due
Diligence in Legal Requirements Acquisition: A Tool-Supported, Frame-Based Approach, 17
IEEE INT'L REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING CONF. 225 (2009), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/-breaux/
publications/tdbreaux-re09.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6QN-6NZ3].
109 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REv. ONLINE 35, 38-39 (2014) ("Smart contracts-automated programs that
transfer digital assets within the block-chain upon certain triggering conditions-represent a new
and interesting form of organizing contractual activity." (footnotes omitted)). The concept of a
"smart contract" is widely believed to have originated in the work of Nick Szabo. See Nick
Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, 2 FIRST MONDAY (1997);
Paul Andrew, Who is Nick Szabo?, COINCENTRAL (Apr. 15, 2018), https://coincentral.comlwho-
is-nick-szabo/ [https://perma.cc/H4TF-RX8D].
110 See, e.g., Due.com, Blockchain Technology Set to Revolutionize the Supply Chain, NAS-
DAQ (May 4, 2017, 10:23 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/blockchain-technology-set-to-rev
olutionize-the-supply-chain-cm784187 [https://perma.ccl5VWB-DPU2].
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automatic exchange after a "1-click" transaction."'l As a former com-
missioner of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission recently
observed, "Where a smart contract's conditions depend upon real-
world data (e.g., the price of a commodity future at a given time),
agreed-upon outside systems, called oracles, can be developed to
monitor and verify prices, performance, or other real-world events." 112
When it comes to more complex products, automation of an ex-
change can run into difficulties. Chickens, for example, might be a
more difficult product to assess, or even weigh, than a standardized
commodity like sugar. In a classic court case, Frigaliment Importing
Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp.113 the litigants disagreed vehe-
mently on what the meaning of the word "chicken" was in a contract.
Robotic assessments of physical reality are still delayed and corroded
by a lack of data or by the messy complexity of discordant human
meanings.114
Therefore, legal automators have focused most of their energy on
contracts related to online activity. For example, Oliver Goodenough
of Vermont Law School and Mark Flood of the Office of Financial
Research have developed the idea of smart contracts as "automatons"
for executing deals once financial agreements have been represented
computationally.11 5 Goodenough and Flood argue that "the funda-
mental legal structure of a well-written financial contract follows a
state-transition logic that can be formalized mathematically as a finite-
state machine (also known as a finite-state automaton)" where the
111 About 1-Click Ordering, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
htmlnodeld=201889620 [https://perma.cc[YB6P-QAAW].
112 Nicolette Kost De Sevres, Bart Chilton & Bradley Cohen, The Blockchain Revolution,
Smart Contracts and Financial Transactions, CYBERSPACE LAW., June 2016, at 3, 3. A smart con-
tract is created by encoding the terms of a traditional contract and uploading the smart contract
to the blockchain. "Contractual clauses are automatically executed when pre-programmed con-
ditions are satisfied," and because the transactions are monitored, validated, and enforced by the
blockchain, there is no need for a trusted third party, such as an escrow agent. Id.
113 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See generally Aaron D. Goldstein, The Public
Meaning Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent, and Contract Interpretation, 53 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 73 (2013) (analyzing the problems posed by the traditional rules of contract interpretation).
114 See Karen E. C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts
and the Social Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING Sci., TECH., & Soc'Y 1 (2017). See generally
concessions made in ADVANCES IN KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION, LOGIC PROGRAMMING, AND
ABs-Acr ARGUMENTATION (Thomas Eiter, Hannes Strass, Miroslaw Truszczynski & Stefan
Woltran eds., 2015); KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION FOR HEALTH CARE (Silvia Miksch, David
Riaflo & Annette ten Teije eds., 2014).
115 See Mark D. Flood & Oliver R. Goodenough, Contract as Automaton: The Computa-
tional Representation of Financial Agreements 4 (Office of Fin. Research Working Paper No. 15-
04, 2015).
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"automaton defines the states that a financial relationship can be in,
such as 'default,' 'delinquency,' 'performing,' etc., and it defines an
'alphabet' of events that can trigger state transitions, such as 'payment
arrives,' 'due date passes,'" and many more.116
For Goodenough and Flood, a sufficiently automated system
could increase both trust and efficiency among contracting parties.1 17
For example, an airline may promise an insurer that it will pay $10,000
on the first day of each month in order to purchase an insurance pol-
icy that pays out $100,000 each month the average price of oil is above
$90 a barrel. A contract like this, often called a "derivative," helps
airlines hedge against rises in fuel prices. Goodenough and Flood be-
lieve that an automaton could effectively robotize the relationship be-
tween the parties.118 The insurer could agree to an automatic transfer
of $100,000 once another computer program indicated that it had cal-
culated the average price of oil that month and confirmed it was be-
low $90 a barrel. The airline could enable automatic debiting of its
bank account when that event occurs. Programmers could also imple-
ment rules if, for some reason, the $10,000 did not come in by mid-
night of the first day of the month.
The question of consequences for failure to meet the terms of the
contract is a difficult one that has major implications for the future of
automation in many legal fields. There are always potential excuses-
for example, the bank may have failed to transmit the funds, a new
employee may have changed the accounts, or the insurer may have
altered its own accounts in a way that made it difficult to pay. We all
have some intuitive sense of what we would decide to be a fair resolu-
tion of any of these situations-or, more to the point, where a contract
or statute might refer the dispute.1 19 But it is a far more formidable
task to program that type of insight-let alone the ability to verify the
factual predicates of each situation-into a single computer, or even
into a network system capable of surveillance of all the parties
involved.
That is one reason why a wise programmer may decide simply to
kick the dispute over to a panel of human mediators, who could be
charged with quickly deciding whether the airline's excuse for the
delayed payment was sufficient to permit it to continue the contract or
116 Id. at 2.
117 See id. at 14.
118 See id. at 3-4.
119 See generally Arthur D. Hellnan, Deciding Who Decides: Understanding the Realities of
Judicial Reform, 15 L. & Soc. INQuiRY 343 (1990).
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whether the excuse enabled the insurer to terminate it. In other
words, humans complementing the automated legal system would
likely be the optimal result for all parties involved. We see this pattern
repeatedly in the history of automation. For example, a computer first
beat a chess grandmaster in the 1990s;120 by the mid-2000s, no
grandmaster could defeat the best programs.1 21 However, a combina-
tion of human and machine can defeat the best chess playing machines
to this day. 1 2 2 Similar cooperative modes are likely to prove optimal in
legal contexts, particularly when the stakes of a dispute are high.12 3
Nevertheless, regulators have urged (and in some cases required)
financial institutions to express their contractual arrangements as
code. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")
and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") staff con-
cluded in a report "that current technology is capable of representing
derivatives using a common set of computer-readable descriptions[,
which] are precise enough to use both for the calculation of net expo-
sures and to serve as part or all of a binding legal contract."1 2 4 That
optimism was also reflected in the agencies' treatment of other securi-
ties. For example, the SEC recently finalized a rule requiring provid-
ers of some asset-backed securities ("ABSs") to file "downloadable
source code in Python" to reflect the contractual arrangements em-
bedded in the securities.1 2 5
120 See Marina Koren, When Computers Started Beating Chess Champions, ATLAnTc (Feb.
10, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/02/when-computers-started-beat
ing-chess-champions/462216/ [https://perma.cc/3NLJ-7WEQ].
121 See Rich Haridy, 2017: The Year AI Beat Us at All Our Own Games, NEw ATLAS (Dec.
26, 2017), https://newatlas.com/ai-2017-beating-humans-games/52741/ [https://perma.cc/S23Y-
V5AZ].
122 DIEGO RAssIGN-GuTMAN, CHESS METAPHORS 154-62 (Deborah Klonsky trans., 2009).
123 See, e.g., Anthony Sills, ROSS and Watson Tackle the Law, IBM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://
www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2016/01/ross-and-watson-tackle-the-law/ [https://perma.cc/VF7Q-
S5E4]; Karen Turner, Meet 'Ross,' the Newly Hired Legal Robot, WASH. POST (May 16, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-hired-le
gal-robot/?utm-term=.7417ebfe0937 [https://perma.cc/ZR98-S4AG].
124 SEc. ExcH. COMM'N & COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, JOINT STUDY ON THE
FEASIBILITY OF MANDATING ALGoRrrHIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR DERIVATIVES 1 (2011), http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/719b-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRY2-VZQK]. Unfortunately,
after considering the vagaries of accounting, securitization, and credit rating described above, it
is difficult to credit the SEC's optimism here. Just as the FDIC's hypothetical resolution of Leh-
man "amused many by its naivetd," the staff appears to be promoting an aspiration as a likely
achievement. Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN.
L. REv. 485, 485-86 (2012).
125 Asset-Backed Securities, 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328 (proposed May 3, 2010), https://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/33-9117.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YCP-9YVN]. This rule was finalized
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Despite that regulatory advance, requiring "filing of a waterfall
computer program of the contractual cash flow provisions of the se-
curities" remains an "outstanding" proposal for the SEC. 126 On first
glance, this forbearance is puzzling-uncertainties about cash flows in
ABS's helped spark the financial crisis of 2008, one of the main moti-
vations behind the Dodd-Frank Act, which required the SEC to better
monitor the ABS market.1 27 The agency's reticence, however, re-
flected valid concerns among commenters representing financial insti-
tutions. For example, J.P. Morgan complained that "[e]ach ABS
transaction has its own distinct characteristics" and it would be expen-
sive and of questionable utility to reduce each new one to Python
code. 128 AmeriCredit bluntly stated that it "should not be forced to
predict and therefore program every possible slight iteration of all wa-
terfall payments" because its firm "runs a business that purchases and
services automobile loans, not a software development business." 12 9
UBmatrix expressed the view that programming obligations were not
superior, in either accuracy or transparency, to simply writing them in
text.130
A common theme animated comments on the proposal for the
automation of cash flows in asset-backed securities. The SEC was pro-
moting a one-size-fits-all requirement of translating legal agreements
into software, while market realities precluded such standardization-
or made it too expensive to be practicable. 13 1 The ensuing barriers to
June 22, 2016. Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229-230, 239,
249 (2018).
126 Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,184, 57,190 (Sept.
24, 2014) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 243, and 249); see also Asset-Backed
Securities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 23,328 (the rule as previously proposed in 2010).
127 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.190 (2017); 17 C.F.R. § 230.193 (2017).
128 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Asset-Backed Securi-
ties (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-10/s70810-213.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZD93-2GAK].
129 AmeriCredit Corp., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Asset-Backed Securities
(Aug. 2, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-10/s70810-128.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NVJ-
LSKL].
130 See UBmatrix, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Asset-Backed Securities
(Jul. 31, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-10/s70810-61.pdf [https://perma.cc/55LZ-
N4A6] ("[R]eading a prospectus in text is easier and more efficient than deciphering code, par-
ticularly if no standards exist around how that code has been developed, or how self-documented
that code must be.").
131 See, e.g., Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities and Committee on Securitiza-
tion and Structured Finance of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Asset-Backed Securities (Aug. 17, 2010), https://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-10/s70810-150.pdf [https://perma.ccl9D82-K48Z] ("[B]ecause ABS
transactions frequently are structured during the marketing process to respond to feedback from
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computerization here should be a cautionary tale for advocates of
legal-process automation who berate the legal profession for provid-
ing "bespoke" services when, they say, mass production would do.1 3 2
The "bespoke" metaphor does a great deal of rhetorical work
that is rarely unpacked by those touting it. A bespoke suit is a luxury,
unneeded by most. The very wealthy may get their clothing personally
tailored, but the rest of society makes do with ready-to-wear outfits.
The simile between clothing manufacture and legal services breaks
down in any moderately complex dispute. Anyone can look in the
mirror and figure out whether his clothing fits or not. Legal advice is a
credence service-it is very hard for the average person to know if he
has been well advised.'3 3 Thus we should be cautious when the startup
Deftr rolls out its services with the motto, "law is not a Rolex," and
implies that democratized law should be as accessible as personalized
time is now-from "a glance at my phone."134 The statements are
more reflective of business aspirations and antiworker ideology than a
solid read of the legal market.
In both the 1930s and the 1960s, leading economic commentators
in the United States predicted permanent mass unemployment thanks
to the rise of machine substitutes for workers-exactly the type of
investors as to their specific needs for a security with a particular feature, each new issuance is
likely to have unique considerations that will require additional design, programming and main-
tenance costs associated with software development, as well as a unique asset data file that will
have to interface with the program.").
132 See, e.g., RIcHARD SussKGND, THE END OF LAWYERS? 33-36 (2008).
133 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (discussing economic models involving trust and un-
certain quality); Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-72 (1973) (exploring credence goods where quality cannot be
evaluated through normal use but only at additional cost); Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation
and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L.
REv 105, 154-55 (2010) ("Both search for and carriage of information tend to be 'credence
goods,' whose value a consumer will have difficulty evaluating even after consuming it.").
134 The Deftr mission statement reads, in part:
The law is not a Rolex.
Some Rolexes are meticulously crafted over a period of a year or more. The com-
plexity of mechanism, design and material make up their extraordinary expense, an
expense that is well beyond the means of most....
Today this precision and accuracy is available in any boilerplate ten-buck wrist-
watch or from a glance at my phone....
We believe that understanding legal rules, properly drafted and interpreted, will
not require the approach of a craftsman.
We believe technology will drive that change.
What We Believe, DEFTR, (July 7, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160831230904/http://
thedeftr.com:80/blog/2016/07/07/what-we-believe [https://perma.cc/LVP3-Z9E3].
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commoditization some futurists predict and celebrate for attorneys.1 35
Like popular and trade-press articles on "the end of lawyers," their
narrative is a simple one: (1) software programs are getting better at
recognizing patterns and even meaning in texts; (2) most of legal prac-
tice is primarily about applying rules to factual situations or predicting
how the relevant authorities would apply the rules to a situation;
(3) computer programmers also apply rules to facts, and as the profes-
sion of coding advances, it will take over more and more rule-applica-
tion scenarios. But even simple scenarios may disclose layers of
complexity and uncertainty impossible to properly code into software
or forms. 136
Consider, first, the question of meaning. Legal processes are con-
cerned with explanation and judgment-a very different set of con-
cerns than the predictive modeling and pattern recognition common
in most legal automation.137 A legal decisionmaker is not simply trying
to ensure that some result (liable or not liable, guilty or innocent)
matches the results generated by the case documents including pat-
terns of words most similar to the patterns of words in the case docu-
ments before the decisionmaker.1 38 Rather, the decisionmaker is
assessing the meaning of the facts and the meaning of the law in the
135 See AMY SUE BIx, INVENTING OURSELVES OUT OF JOBS? 1-3 (2000); DAVID F. NOBLE,
FORCE OF PRODUCTION, at xii (1984). These concerns focused on manufacturing and some sim-
ple service-sector jobs. By the 1980s, advances in artificial intelligence at the time led to a flurry
of concern within the legal profession about the substitutability of machine for human judgment.
See, e.g., Steve Lohr, A.. Is Doing Legal Work But It Won't Replace Lawyers, Yet., N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.nytines.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyers-artificial-intelli
gence. html [https://perma.cc/D43P-SNJD]. These concerns subsided for about two decades but
are now expressed almost daily on legal blogs.
136 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 392 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Even the briefest reflection on the tasks for which lawyers are
trained and the variation among the services they perform should caution against facile assump-
tions that legal services can be classified into the routine and the unique. In most situations it is
impossible-both for the client and the lawyer-to identify with reasonable accuracy in advance
the nature and scope of problems that may be encountered even when handling a matter that at
the outset seems routine. Neither quantitative nor qualitative measurement of the service actu-
ally needed is likely to be feasible in advance.").
137 See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, "Plausible Cause": Explanatory Standards in the
Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (2017) (distinguishing between intuitively
plausible chains of causation and big data pattern recognition in the Fourth Amendment
context).
138 Pasquale & Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviorism,
supra note 2, at 79 ("[There are] potential flaws in many [machine learning]-driven research
programs using [natural language processing ("NLP")] to predict outcomes in legal systems.
When such research programs ignore meaning-the foundation of legal reasoning-their utility
and social value is greatly diminished. We also believe that such predictive tools are, at present,
largely irrelevant to debates in jurisprudence. If they continue to gloss over the question of social
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situation. Legal functions that seem routine to a nonlawyer may create
scenarios that require policy judgment, wisdom, and a responsibility
akin to legislation or governance. 139
Consider, for instance, a very common problem in the United
States chronicled in David Dayen's book, Chain of Title.140 After the
financial crisis of 2008, banks were foreclosing on millions of home-
owners. 1 4 1 Many homeowners tried to negotiate for restructuring of
their debt, but debt services turned them away. 14 2 Some homeowners
noticed that the entities on the paperwork filed for the foreclosure did
not seem to match the paperwork they were sent when their mortgage
was sold to a trust in order to complete a mortgage-backed security. 143
As Dayen chronicles, many of the banks and the trusts holding mort-
gage-backed securities did not in fact fill out the correct paperwork in
order to verify their claim to ownership of the property they were
suing for.144
This was a genuinely difficult dilemma for property law. Lawyers
had to rapidly analyze the relevant law and make a novel case for
their clients. Moreover, in many states, this was not a situation where
homeowners could wait for an app to develop to parse their problems.
For example, in New York, foreclosure notices often contained a
warning that those served with them had to dispute the ownership of
the property by the mortgagee (if they wished to do so) within twenty
days of receiving the notice.145 A minimally competent lawyer working
and human meaning in legal systems, NLP researchers should expect justified neglect of their
work by governments, law firms, businesses, and the legal academy.").
139 See JEFFREY LIPSHAw, BEYOND LEGAL REASONING 158-62 (2017) (discussing the role
of wisdom in law).
140 DAVID DAYEN, CHAIN OF TITLE: How THREE ORDINARY AMERICANS UNCOVERED
WALL STREET'S GREAT FoRECLosuRE FRAUD (2016).
141 See id. at 3.
142 See id. at 100.
143 This was unsurprising given the rise of "robo-signing" as a fraudulent method of rapidly
disposing of foreclosure cases. See Jeff Harrington, 2010 Adds Its Own Tenninology to Business
Lexicon, TAMPA BAY TIMEs (Dec. 23, 2010, 4:39 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20150421
073909/http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/2010-adds-its-own-terminology-to-business-lexi
con/1141681 [https://perma.cc/NA2L-WK8V] ("Robo-sign[ing involves] . . . a back-office system
of quickly signing off on foreclosure documents like affidavits without actually doing what the
affidavits say was done.").
144 See DAYEN, supra note 140, at viii-ix.
145 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 265-a.8(b) (McKinney 2018) ("The equity purchaser and
his or her successor in interest if the successor is not a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer for
value as set forth in paragraph (c) of this subdivision, shall have twenty days after the delivery of
the notice in which to reconvey title to the property free and clear of encumbrances created
subsequent to the rescinded transaction and which are due to the actions of the equity
purchaser.").
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in this field would know that the status of a defense as either jurisdic-
tional or waivable would be a matter of utmost urgency to the cli-
ent.146 Sadly, basic terms like these are either unknown or
unappreciated by many of the coders now aspiring to computerize le-
gal advice.
Of course, few outside the foreclosure industry would endorse
the severity of the twenty-day rule or similar inflexibilities in legal sys-
tems. They are noted here to mark the extreme inappropriateness of
many aspects of the Silicon Valley-startup mentality in contemporary
legal practice. 147 The legal trade press-often funded by advertising
dollars from legaltech firms-tends toward blanket characterizations
of disruptive firms as a breath of fresh air for a stodgy legal profes-
sion.148 They gloss over the fact that good legal practice is built upon
care, meticulousness, and proofreading because mistakes can be irre-
versible-filings have page limits, 1 4 9 many issues not raised at trial
cannot be raised on appeal,150 and in some situations, even "actual
innocence" is not enough to spare a wrongfully convicted inmate from
the death penalty.15 1
146 See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 36 (2011) ("The distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction
and waivable defenses is not a mere nicety of legal metaphysics. It rests instead on the central
principle of a free society that courts have finite bounds of authority, some of constitutional
origin, which exist to protect citizens from ... the excessive use of judicial power." (quoting U.S.
Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 77 (1988))).
147 See KATHERINE LossE, THE Boy KINGs 38 (2012) ("The hacker's capacity to surprise-
or in Silicon Valley parlance, disrupt-is fetishized in the valley as a source of power and profit
for tech companies, Facebook among them, which considers its stated ability to 'move fast and
break things' a core company value.").
148 See Sarah Reed, Lawyer, Disrupt Thyself, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 22, 2014), https://tech
crunch.com/2014/03/21/lawyer-disrupt-thyself/ [https://perma.cc/59Y2-FPYM]; Michael
Skapinker, Technology: Breaking the Law, FIN. THWEs (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/con
tent/c3a9347e-fdb4-11e5-b5f5-070dca6dOaOd [https://perma.cc/ZT6R-Q7MX]; Who's a Legal Re-
bel?, A.B.A. J., http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/about/ [https://perma.cc/S4YG-MXDG];
Why Legal Disruption is Working, LINKILAw (Dec. 29, 2015), http://linkilaw.com/blog/why-legal-
disruption-is-working/ [https://perma.cc/K2HB-9C5C].
149 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 809 F.2d 419, 424-25 (7th Cir. 1987) (fin-
ing lawyers personally for exceeding page limits).
150 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1992) (stating that where a trial court
makes an error that affects the "substantial rights" of a party and said error is not brought to the
attention of the court, the Utah Supreme Court may take notice of the error under Utah Rules
of Evidence).
151 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (acknowledging that where a persuasive
demonstration of actual innocence made after trial would render execution of a defendant un-
constitutional, the disruptive effect on the judicial system for entertaining such claims of actual
innocence would require overcoming a high threshold to show a right to such a demonstration
exists).
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C. Blockchain as a Substitute for Property Recordation
Bespoke contracts (and regulatory responses to them) are likely
to persist in the realm of high finance. Contracts are often too com-
plex and variable, and require too much human judgment, to be relia-
bly coded into software. Code may reflect and in large part implement
what the parties intended, but it cannot itself serve as the contract or
business agreement among them.
Still, some technologists and lawyers aspire to that subsumption,
echoing older movements for financial deregulation.15 2 The rise of
Bitcoin as an alternative currency has sparked an interest in automa-
tion of transactions and recordation.ss Software can allow distributed
computers to transfer information en masse and monitor one an-
other.154 Bitcoin is a particular case of using blockchain technology to
ensure a durable record of ownership that is intended to be regulated
by code.155 Blockchain enthusiasts envision it scaling to serve as a dis-
tributed ledger of all manner of transactions.1 56
Consider a simple transaction: the transfer of title of a car. At
present, this type of transfer may take a trip, in person, to the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"), and filling out paperwork is a pre-
requisite for a valid transfer. In the case of car titles, we can think of
the DMV as a kind of bank: just as banks monitor when money has
been deposited or spent, the DMV maintains a record of when, for
any given person or legal entity, the ownership of a car begins or ends.
Blockchain software could store, on distributed computers, a com-
plete list of who owns which car, just as peer-to-peer file sharing
software maintains a list of locations of where given (parts of) files are
located. 157 Anyone can instantly transmit to all the other computers
152 See DAVID GOLUMBIA, THE POLITIcs OF BITCOIN: SoFTWARE AS RIGHT-WING Ex-
TREMISM 2-4 (2016) (describing parallels between cryptocurrency movement, crypto-anarchist
beliefs, and older movements to discredit or dismantle financial regulation and central banking).
153 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 805-06 (2015) ("In-
creased interest in cryptocurrencies has driven the development of a series of technologies for
creating public, cryptographically secure ledgers of property interests that do not rely on trust in
a specific entity to curate the list.").
154 See Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, and Governance, 2006 MIcH. ST. L.
REV. 153, 156-60.
155 See De Sevres, Chilton & Cohen, supra note 112 at 3. A blockchain is a peer-to-peer
network where each computer in the network verifies and records every transaction on the net-
work, where transactions are only recorded on the ledger once the network confirms the validity
of the transaction, thus preventing third-party manipulation and streamlining the record. See id.
156 See Fairfield, supra note 153, at 808-09.
157 See ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES
43-45 (2016) (explaining cryptocurrencies in depth and how "mining" works); DON TAPscoTT &
ALEX TAPscoTr, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION 6-8 (paperback ed. 2018) (explaining how
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his desire to transfer ownership of his car to a willing buyer.- 8 The
same system could also be programmed to coordinate the transmis-
sion of the seller's "I've sold my car" signal with the seller's "I've just
deposited $5,000 in the buyer's bank account" signal. Blockchain en-
thusiasts aim to render not just DMVs, but banks and other institu-
tions of trust, obsolete. 1 5 9
While the computational processes here may be complex, their
recordation function is relatively simple. Each transaction is modeled
as a link in a chain, and the public ledgers at any given time reflect a
"block" of all past transactions.160 Thus the name "blockchain" boils
down to a physical metaphor (a chain of blocks) for socio-technical
arrangement. There are glimmers of this kind of distributed trust al-
ready in software like Venmo, which runs on top of Facebook and
allows instantaneous monetary transfers among friends. 1 6 1 Finance
blockchain technology creates a ledger of transactions); PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE
AGE OF CRYFTOCURRENCY 5 (2015) ("At their core, cryptocurrencies are built around the prin-
ciple of a universal, inviolable ledger, one that is made fully public and is constantly being veri-
fied by these high-powered computers, each essentially acting independently of the others....
The network-based ledger-which in the case of most cryptocurrencies is called a blockchain-
works as a stand-in for the middlemen since it can just as effectively tell us whether the
counterparty to a transaction is good for his or her money."); Kariappa Bheemaiah, Blockchain
2.0: The Renaissance of Money, WIRED (Jan. 2015), http://www.wired.com/insights/2015/01/block
chain-2-0/ [https://perma.ccl4SC2-QLSS] ("The miner uses the computational power of his com-
puter to assure all members of the network that each transaction is between 2 parties only and
that there is no problem of double spending.").
158 See James Grimmelmann & Arvind Narayanan, The Blockchain Gang, SLATE (Feb. 16,
2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future-tense/2016/02/bitcoin..s..blockchaintech
nology-wont-change-everything.html [https://perma.cc/Q3PM-C8WC] ("You, and the
mechanic, and the thousands of other bitcoin users, all keep track of one another's account
balances on your own computers. The 1.09 bitcoins you'd pay ... is assembled into a 'block' with
a few hundred transactions from other users. Every 10 minutes, a new block is added to the
'chain' of all transactions so far. Everyone who wants may keep a copy of the block chain and
can easily check it to see who has how many bitcoins.... [The goal is] secure anonymous trans-
fers of stocks, cars, houses, or just about any other commodity.").
159 The Promise of the Blockchain: The Trust Machine, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015), http://
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21677198-technology-behind-bitcoin-could-transform-how-
economy-works-trust-machine [https://perma.cc/5TDH-R8ZY] ("The spread of blockchains is
bad for anyone in the 'trust business'-the centralised institutions and bureaucracies, such as
banks, clearing houses and government authorities that are deemed sufficiently trustworthy to
handle transactions. . .. The notion of shared public ledgers [to replace such firms and govern-
mental entities] may not sound revolutionary or sexy. Neither did double-entry book-keeping or
joint-stock companies. Yet, like them, the blockchain is an apparently mundane process that has
the potential to transform how people and businesses co-operate.").
160 NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 157, at 11.
161 See Sylvan Lane, The Beginner's Guide to Venmo, MASHABLE (June 30, 2014), http://
mashable.com/2014/06/30/venmo-beginners-guide/#HG2q8DXMrZq3 [https://perma.cc/JF7Q-
SUY3]; Team Venmo, Sending & Requesting Money, VENMO (Dec. 26, 2016), https://
help.venmo.com/hcen-us/articles/210413477 [https://perma.cc/L6JP-B6PK]; Ethan Wolff-Mann,
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apps that run on top of China's WeChat messaging system are even
more powerful and pervasive. 1 62
A blockchain for transferring title could essentially amount to a
digital key. 16 3 Once the owner is recognized by the system as a whole,
that system's assent to his locking or unlocking his car would seem to
be more robust than physical keys (which can be lost) or keychain
signal transmitters (which break easily). A series of numbers, verified
by the public ledger, would be the new "key" to ownership or access.
Given enthusiasm expressed for blockchain at the highest levels
of international finance and the federal government64 states may
soon explore replacing the title transfer function of their DMVs with a
blockchain-based public ledger of ownership transactions. Such a digi-
tal transition would cut out a fair number of annoying, time-consum-
ing trips. Some state workers would lose their jobs, but most do not
seem all that enthusiastic to be pushing paper in windowless warrens.
Using technology to modernize transactions would seem to be a huge
opportunity for politicians eager to both save personnel costs and re-
duce inconvenience for constituents. 16 5
Yet there are also reasons for caution. Blockchain advocates have
not fully clarified what happens if someone ignores computational de-
The Scary Thing You Don't Understand About Venmo, TIME (Sept. 21, 2015), https://time.com/
money/4036511/venmo-more-check-than-cash/ [https://perma.cclDK5K-CF7H].
162 See Connie Chan, When One App Rules Them All: The Case of WeChat and Mobile in
China, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (Aug. 6, 2015), https://al6z.com/2015/08/06/wechat-china-mo
bile-first/ [https://perma.cc/7QYF-WGRB] (describing the WeChat Wallet menu as a site of
"1) built-in trust since designated partners have been vetted and selected by Tencent, as well as
2) automatic authentication of identity and payment, and 3) the ability to offer seamless exper-
iences with third parties while never requiring the user to leave the WeChat app").
163 See Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIz. L. REV. 359, 404
(2016); Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. ONLINE 35, 38-39 (2014) ("If financial transactions can be freed of banks as in-
termediaries, then contracts can be freed of courts as intermediaries.").
164 See, e.g., R. JESSE MCWATERS ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF FINAN-
CIAL INFRASTRUCTURE: AN AMBrrIouS LOOK AT How BLOCKCHAIN CAN RESHAPE FINANCIAL
SERVICES (2016); S. AFRICAN RESERVE BANK, PosrrION PAPER ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES
(2014); David Mills et al., Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and Settlement
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2016-095, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres
data/feds/2016/fles/2016095pap.pdf [https://perma.ccl8P4X-V3SG].
165 See STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFoRD, THE RESPONSIVE CITY 120 (2014)
(describing an automated process for collecting city data across agencies that "greatly improved
in-house analytic capacity across several agencies, radically changing the city's way of doing busi-
ness"); BETH SIMONE NOVECK, SMART CITIZENS, SMARTER STATE 106 (2015) ("[T]he processes
of matching the supply of expertise to the demand for it within organizations is becoming more
automated in the twenty-first century.").
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scriptions of legal reality.1 66 For example, imagine if the seller above
simply fails to deliver the car. Can the buyer call the police to seize the
car? Must the buyer file a lien? If the buyer does file suit, is the state
of the public ledger conclusive evidence of the transfer?
The lawyer/coder James Grimmelmann and computer scientist
Arvind Narayanan (coauthor of one of the leading textbooks on
blockchain technology) have raised these questions in a brief but dev-
astating critique of the fragility of distributed ledgers.1 67 If a hacker
manages to copy the number series used by a car's owner, the hacker
might easily transfer both the car and the record of who owns it to
someone else.168 In other words, while legal automation giveth, it also
taketh away. The normal car-title recordation system can be tire-
somely meticulous and redundant, but it also offers resilience.1 69 A
state database is a record of ownership distinct from the blockchain.
So even if automated title transfer became popular, it would seem
necessary to keep some official backup.1 70
Despite such problems, there is still enormous enthusiasm for
more widespread adoption of legal technology. Part of this enthusiasm
stems from investors looking for new sectors to conquer. Venture cap-
italist Marc Andreessen spoke for many when he hoped for software
to "eat the world"-that is, for programs (and robots animated by
them) to perform tasks once done by humans.1 71 A good number of
166 See Dirk Baur & Niels Van Quaquebeke, The Blockchain Does Not Eliminate the Need
for Trust, CONVERSATION (Nov. 15, 2017, 8:26 PM), https://theconversation.com/the-blockchain-
does-not-eliminate-the-need-for-trust-86481 [bttps://perma.cc/6VER-EMS4].
167 See Grimmelmann & Narayanan, supra note 158.
168 See id. ("[I]f a hacker gets access to your computer and can read your digital key, he's
home free because he can transfer the car on the block chain to a key that he controls.").
169 See id. ("There is a trade-off in any system of property law. You can have hard rules:
simple, cheap, and clear-cut. Or you can have soft rules: flexible case-by-case responses to unan-
ticipated messes. . . . Block chains are the hardest property technology ever made. They're im-
pervious to dumb mistakes, like DMV clerks mistyping a vehicle identification number or losing
your papers behind the radiator. But they're so hard they're brittle.").
170 See id.
171 Marc Andreessen, Why Software is Eating the World, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460 [https://
perma.cc/MD8E-HFD3]; see Mariano-Florentino Cu6llar, Deciding Whether Software Will Eat
the Bureaucracy, REG. REV. (Dec. 22, 2016) https://www.theregreview.org/2016/12/22/cuellar-de
ciding-software-eat-bureaucracy/ [https://perma.cc/2YKJ-J596] ("Lawyers and policymakers will
almost certainly need to adjust their approaches to using automation in the administrative
state . . . . At its core, the administrative state is about reconciling calculations of social welfare
with procedural constraints. It is an enterprise that pivots in subtle and profound ways on human
institutions, assumptions, and aspirations-however imperfectly fulfilled-for deliberation."). In
both articles, the metaphor of transformation as "eating" business or bureaucracy should spur
reflection on what happens to food once it is digested.
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lawyers share that enthusiasm. That may seem odd-who wants to be
replaced by a machine? 172 One reason is a classic desire of one part of
the profession to assert a kind of superiority over the rest.173 Some are
prone to view the practice of law with detachment and disdain,
presuming it to be a rote and formalistic affair easily boiled down to a
set of programmable propositions. Combine that condescension with
contrived but powerful business imperatives to "reduce legal spend,"
and the legaltech revolution always seems near at hand.
Thus, there is a steady drumbeat of articles proposing distributed
ledgers for a wide variety of applications in law. Some propose
blockchain technology as a way for businesses to maintain a ledger for
timekeeping, billing, financial transactions, and other records-a mod-
est step that does not implicate the types of coordination and inter-
operability problems discussed above.174 Michael Abramowicz's
Cryptocurrency-Based Law outlines an ambitious vision for using
blockchain applications to coordinate endeavors now organized via
law. 175 Rather than voting shares in meetings, participants in an organ-
ization could bid with Bitcoins to promote one course of action over
others.1 7 6 One of the great appeals of blockchain, as opposed to other
software, is its supposedly immutable character-that is, its resistance
to being altered once its parameters have been coded.17 7 Automobile
lenders have already introduced the basic foundations of such technol-
ogy: when payments are late, a "starter interrupt device" can disable a
debtor's car. 78 The payment of funds held in escrow can also be "self-
executing" once some code-specified trigger is tripped.179 Trust law
172 Indeed, at the beginning of legal education in America, Harvard Law School Dean Ros-
coe Pound lamented what he called "mechanical jurisprudence," suggesting that only a nuanced
view of social science and social reality could legitimate the imposition of regulation. See Roscoe
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 621-22 (1908).
173 See, e.g., Daniel Martin Katz, The MIT School of Law? A Perspective on Legal Educa-
tion in the 21st Century, 2014 U. ILL. L. REv. 1431, 1457-63 (attempting to appropriate the
prestige of technical education for courses focused on legal technology).
174 See Victor Li, Bitcoin's Useful Backbone, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2016, at 31.
175 See Abramowicz, supra note 163, at 404.
176 See id. at 391.
177 See id. at 373; TAPSCOTT & TAPscorr, supra note 157, at 6-8. For skepticism about
claims of immutability, see Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 713, 735-45 (2017).
178 See Jathan Sadowski & Frank A. Pasquale, Creditors Use New Devices to Put Squeeze
on Debtors, AL JAZEERA AM. (Nov. 9, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/
2014/11/debt-collection-technologystarterinterruptdevicesubprime.htm [https://perma.cc/E3SU-
SF72] ("There is no escaping debt collectors who can, with the push of a button on their
smartphones, disable your car until you cough up payment.").
179 See Abramowicz, supra note 163, at 405-06.
[Vol. 87:136
A RULE OF PERSONS, NOT MACHINES
could also enable peer-to-peer decisionmaking processes to reduce
transaction costs for disbursements.8 0 Abramowicz even foresees the
spread of blockchain to investment firms, 181 both for core business
purposes and to engage in regulatory arbitrage. 182 He also sees a role
for blockchain applications in insurance. 183
Legal scholars have also prescribed potential blockchain-enabled
management of micropayments.1 84 In the past, when Congress realized
that new technology would lead to widespread copying, it imposed a
small fee per copy-a practice known as compulsory licensing. 85 This
regime, still in place for many works, separates compensation (for
works) from control (over their use).18 6 For blockchain advocates,
software could take on the role of law-artists could make their work
exclusively available via blockchain applications, setting their own
rates for downloads or streams of copyrighted works.' 87 The ultimate
promise here is to set up systems of content distribution that balance
commercial imperatives and creative freedoms in a more nimble man-
ner than current law. 8 8
Framed as parts of an existing legal system, all of these proposals
disclose promising applications of social software. However, they are
occasionally promoted as a substitute for the legal system itself. That
substitution would reflect not merely the algorithmic application of
180 Id. at 408-09; see also Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and
the Zero-Member LLC, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 257 (2014).
181 See Abramowicz, supra note 163, at 411.
182 See id. at 412; see also Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability
for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1484-85 (2011) (stating that
regulatory arbitrage is "the shifting of activity to the least stringent regulatory regime," occur-
ring "when an entity reclassifies, relocates, or slightly alters its activity in order to avoid legal
scrutiny traditionally associated with that activity").
183 See Michael Abramowicz, Cryptoinsurance, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 705 (2015).
Abramowicz believes that insurance companies can sell insurance, using a cryptocurrency, based
on smart contracts that authorize transactions based on a third-party or voting process. Id. at
705-06. Abramowicz also argues that attempts to regulate cryptoinsurance would be subject to
many of the difficulties in regulating cryptocurrency; however, the article does offer possible
directions for regulation such as simply banning the practice, or by making cryptoinsurance re-
dundant or unnecessary by mandating other forms of insurance. Id. at 706-08.
184 See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 153, at 831.
185 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (compulsory licensing for phonorecords).
186 See wILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE
OF ENTERTAINMENT 144-45 (2004). Fisher has offered a detailed and compelling proposal to
subsidize culture by lightly taxing the technology that leads to its uncompensated duplication.
See id. at 199-258. Government could also impose such fees on carriers and search engines and
distribute them to creatives.
187 See Tom W. Bell, Copyrights, Privacy, and the Blockchain, 42 Omo N.U. L. REv. 439,
444 (2016).
188 FISHER, supra note 186, at 203.
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rules, but the values of other human beings trusted as participants in
governance as more than appliers of technical rules. Engineers with
little or no domain expertise in the legal profession should not code
software designed to replace that governance, and those with such do-
main expertise would be wise to decline to do so, as the next Section
shows.
D. The Inescapability of Governance
Though sober reports from the World Economic Forum, Deloitte,
and governmental entities give a good sense of the incrementalist side
of fintech, much of the excitement about the topic of financial tech-
nology arises out of a more futuristic perspective.1 89 On Twitter,
hashtags like #legaltech, #regtech, #insurtech, and #fintech often con-
vene enthusiasts who aspire to revolutionize the financial landscape-
or at least to make a good deal of money disrupting existing "trust
institutions" (e.g., the intermediaries which help store and transfer fi-
nancial assets).
For many advocates of cryptocurrencies, the blockchain's cryp-
tography is celebrated as a democratization of encryption.190 Given
their distributed nature, blockchains are also touted as way to create
an alternative legal system beyond the reach of traditional legal au-
thorities.1 91 Ironically, the same celebrations of the power of
blockchain applications also tend to worry that premature regulation
could limit the impact of blockchains.19 They should clarify whether
any programs really are "unstoppable," or whether regulation and
force could stifle them.
Immutability is the main characteristic of blockchain that is sup-
posed to set it apart from past social software and enable it to replace,
rather than merely operate as an adjunct to, existing legal systems. 193
Those accepting the terms of the relevant code are supposed to be
assured that whatever happens to the rest of the world in the future,
their transactions are guaranteed to be valid. But are blockchains re-
ally capable of preventing hacking or tampering? Short of a fortified
189 See, e.g., R. JESSE MCWATERS ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM, BEYOND FINTECH: A
PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF DISRUPTIVE POTENTIAL IN FINANCIAL SERVICES (2017).
190 See, e.g., Jerry Brito et al., Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Predic-
tion Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 149-50 (2014).
191 Id. at 217-18 (discussing the difficult nature of regulating Bitcoin financial transactions).
192 See, e.g., KYLE BURGESS & JOE COLANGELO, CONSUMERS' RESEARCH, THE PROMISE
OF BrrCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN 23-25 (2015), http://consumersresearch.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/BwWhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BXJ-YQH7].
193 See id. at 13.
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HAL 9000 terminating would-be hackers before they could access the
relevant blockchains, it is hard to imagine such assurances being veri-
fiable. 1 94 When billed as a replacement for law or lawyers, code imme-
diately runs into both conceptual and practical difficulties.
Moreover, some early adopters of this ideal of self-executing or
coded law have experienced troubling and telling failures.195 Investors
in a "decentralized autonomous organization" ("The DAO") running
on code have already experienced the turbulent and troubling aspects
of software-governed legal orders.196 In early 2016, a hacker managed
to take millions of dollars in a fashion unanticipated by the drafters of
the code governing the organization.1' The main organizer of The
DAO, Vitalik Buterin, then was able to retaliate because the code
only enabled the withdrawal of funds after a twenty-seven-day waiting
period.198 He coded a "hard fork" for the organization, which essen-
tially shifted funds from the hacker's account to an account where the
original investors in the project could withdraw their funds.19
194 See Chip Stewart, Do Androids Dream of Electric Free Speech? Visions of the Future of
Copyright, Privacy and the First Amendment in Science Fiction, 19 Comm. L. & POL'Y 433, 457
(2014) (describing the role of the space ship's intelligent computer in 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY
(Stanley Kubrick Productions 1968)).
195 See Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in the World
of Virtual Currency, N.Y. TImEs (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/
dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-than-50-million-from-experimental-cybercurrency-
project.html?_- r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z77M-M7CP] ("The attack most likely puts an end to the
project, known as the Decentralized Autonomous Organization, which had raised $160 million in
the form of Ether, an alternative to the digital currency Bitcoin.").
196 See id.
197 See Michael del Castillo, The DAO: Or How a Leaderless Ethereum Project Raised $50
Million, CorNDESK (July 30, 2017, 4:02 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/the-dao-just-raised-50-
million-but-what-is-it/ [https://perma.cc/55X3-GJXPI. Investors purchase DAO tokens using
ether, which allows them to vote on which proposals are accepted or rejected. Id. Investors who
do not agree with the accepted proposal have the option to undergo "splitting," a process where
The DAO smart contract gives back ether to the holder, creating a sub-DAO for the holder. Id.
There is an approximately twenty-three second window in the "splitting" process, between The
DAO smart contract sending ether to the holder and the contract checking to see if the correct
amount was sent, upon which the smart contract would not re-send ether if requested. Id. The
attacker created a recursive function to utilize this twenty-three second window to continuously
request the same amount of ether, accumulating the ether in a sub-DAO before the smart con-
tract checked the amount sent. Id.
198 See Vitalik Buterin, Critical Update Re: DAO Vulnerability, ETHEREUM BLOG (June 17,
2016), https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/ [https://
perma.cclF54C-FOR6].
199 See Michael del Castillo, The Hard Fork- What's About to Happen to Ethereum and The
DAO, CoLNDESK (updated July 24, 2016), https://www.coindesk.comlhard-fork-ethereum-dao/
[https://perma.cc/5CAM-TGKC]; Rob Price, Digital Currency Ethereum Is Cratering Because of
a $50 Million Hack., Bus. INSIDER (June 17, 2016, 5:34 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
dao-hacked-ethereum-crashing-in-value-tens-of-milions-allegedly-stolen-2016-6?r=UK&IR=T
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According to Buterin and other organizers of The DAO, this in-
tervention was a success story: it proved the recoverability of their
system.200 But for advocates of legal automation, this was a Pyrrhic
victory. The post hoc intervention violated the principle of autonomy
supposedly at the core of The DAO. 2 01 Persons managed the smart
contract-not mere code. 202 In other words, the only way the suppos-
edly smart, incorruptible, automated, and immutable contract actually
protected investors was by allowing human intervention to change its
terms and consequences. Rather than demonstrating the dispensability
of human interventions, The DAO has proved the opposite-the vital
necessity of human governance over even extensively coded and com-
puterized forms of human cooperation. And this governance, to the
extent it was legitimate, could only be known to be so, thanks to the
explanation offered by The DAO's sponsors-an explanation made in
language, not code.203
Blockchain enthusiasts need to directly address these concerns
before promoting further substitutive automation of law. It is tempt-
ing to view software as an all-purpose way of dispatching with middle-
men like lawyers and banks. But, as James Grimmelmann observed in
2005, "software is vulnerable to failure," "[software] is hackable," and
"[software] is not robust." 204 No one has yet developed technology
that would make the blockchain environment impervious to these
problems.205 Indeed, precisely the opposite is true: waves of hacking
[https://perma.cc/EG7G-SP59]; see also Vitalik Buterin, Hard Fork Completed, ETHEREUM
BLOG (July 20, 2016), https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/07/20/hard-fork-completed/ [https://
perma.cc/WY2U-TQSL].
200 See Buterin, supra note 199.
201 See Matt Levine, Blockchain Company's Smart Contracts Were Dumb, BLOOMBERG
(June 17, 2016, 5:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.comlview/articles/2016-06-17/blockchain-com
pany-s-smart-contracts-were-dumb [https://perma.ccl5PP7-PH5B].
202 See id.
203 See Buterin, supra note 199.
204 James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1742-44 (2005) (em-
phasis omitted).
205 See generally, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Anarchy, Status Updates, and Utopia, 35 PACE
L. REV. 135 (2014) (illustrating the persistence of governance problems in social software).
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and illicit intrusions have rocked health care institutions,206 banks 207
and even campaigns 208 and governments. 2 0 9
The question of vulnerabilities is critical to defining the norma-
tive core and legal standing of blockchain projects. For example, in
The DAO incident mentioned above, some argued that the hacker was
the one who truly understood the spirit of blockchain, because the
hacker's actions were allowed under the coding of The DAO. 2 1 0 If the
real core of blockchain is unstoppable automation via code, then the
hacker should be allowed to keep the funds taken. Reversing the
hacking is a reflection of values outside the smart contract as it existed
at the time the hack happened. 211 Those are legal and political values
that need to be fully articulated: Who gets to be part of the decision-
making cadre? Is it a Wikipedia-style project of collaboration struc-
tured by hierarchy? 212 If So, is there anything to learn from
Wikipedia's problems and limits?213 Do Blockchain projects' commit-
206 See, e.g., Jessica Jardine Wilkes, The Creation of HIPAA Culture: Prioritizing Privacy
Paranoia over Patient Care, 2014 BYU L. REv. 1213, 1228 (2014) ("In 2009, the Office of Civil
Rights started recording incidents of [patient health information] breaches and created the 'Wall
of Shame,' which publicly exposes breaches affecting 500 people or more.").
207 See, e.g., Paul Merrion, NY Fed's Role in SWIFT Cyber Heist Prompts House Panel
Data Request, CO ROLL CALL, June 2, 2016, 2016 WL 3085306 (describing hack of Bangladesh's
central bank).
208 See, e.g., Anthony J. Gaughan, Ramshackle Federalism: America's Archaic and Dysfunc-
tional Presidential Election System, 85 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1021, 1033-34 (2016) (discussing Rus-
sian hackers); Melissa Eddy, After a Cyberattack, Germany Fears Election Disruption, N.Y.
TIMEs (Dec. 8, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2ho3oBQ [https1/perma.cc/EW6Y-TTDL].
209 See, e.g., Tim McCormack, The Sony and OPM Double Whammy: International Law
and Cyber "Attacks," 18 SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 379, 380 (2015) (discussing the hack of the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management ("OPM")).
210 Levine, supra note 201 ("To true believers in smart contracts, there is no problem here.
The system is fine; the failures-writing bad code and not anticipating this attack-were trivial,
mere human error. Next time, write better smart contracts and you'll be fine. To those true
believers, changing the code after the fact-even to conform it to almost-everyone's reasonable
expectations about how The DAO would work-would be a betrayal of the smart-contract
ideal." (footnotes omitted)).
211 See id.
212 See YOCHAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKs 60-64 (2006); CLAY SHIRKY, HERE
CoMEs EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONs 117-22 (2008).
213 See Philip Mirowski, Postface: Defining Neoliberalism, in THE ROAD FROM MONT
PALERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 417-48 (Philip Mirowski &
Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009) ("Wikipedia in action is not some democratic libertarian paradise in
cyberspace, but rather is predicated on a strict hierarchy, in which higher levels exist to frustrate
and undo the activities of participants at lower levels. The notion that 'everyone can edit' is
simply not true: many controversial pages would not even exist were interventions from those
lower down in the hierarchy not blocked." (footnote omitted)). See generally Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472 (2007) (reviewing BENKLER, supra
note 212)) (detailing limits of peer-production model).
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ments to decentralization have to yield when certain problems in
smart contracts are exposed? If so, how are these "constitutional mo-
ments" (to apply Bruce Ackerman's constitutionalist term of art to
digitized law) recognizable? 214
The problem of "irreversibility" also needs to be clarified as to its
technical and legal dimensions. Does it mean that (1) legal rules or
contracts will preclude blockchain-connected parties from availing
themselves of the legal system? Or (2) is there something inherent in
the code that makes reversibility much harder? Or (3) is the code, at
present, a way of evading or avoiding legal re-examination of the
transaction that could eventually be reformed to make the transac-
tions more amenable to legal reversibility?
Possibilities (1) and (3) would be a reassuring message but would
also undermine blockchain enthusiasts' claims about the novelty of
blockchain scenarios (since (1) is already a standard part of consumer
contracts disclaiming liability and (3) is a problem that has been ad-
dressed by regulators for at least a decade).
There is also a basic conflict over the nomenclature of blockchain
projects. They can either be public and permissionless, or private and
permissioned. 215 Major banks, government institutions, and global fo-
rums tend to promote private and permissioned blockchains. 216 This
distinction is critical because, at present, the private/permissioned and
public/permissionless schools of blockchain appear to be trading off
one another's distinctive appeal. For example, high-level banking
managers style themselves as tribunes of the people for advancing
blockchain, pointing to the idealistic impulses of the public/permis-
sionless school. 217 Meanwhile, those advocating public/permissionless
214 See 2 BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 5-11 (1998) (describing
the rare times when a populace is so mobilized that it can change fundamental constitutional
rules).
215 Angela Walch provides concise definitions:
Private (permissioned) blockchains are common ledgers shared amongst a known
group of parties with only certain parties having the ability, or permission, to make
changes to the ledger. Public (permissionless) blockchains like Bitcoin's are pub-
licly available common ledgers that allow anyone who runs the Bitcoin software to
participate in making changes to the ledger.
Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of
Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 837, 840-41 n.15 (2015) (citing BrrFURY
GRP. & JEFF GARZIK, PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE BLOCKCHAINS: PART 1: PERMISSIONED
BLOCKCHAINS 10 (2015), https://bitfury.comlcontent/downloads/public-vs-private-ptl-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YM9K-7637]).
216 See, e.g., BrrFURY GRP. & JEFF GARZIK, supra note 215, at 3-4 (describing financial
systems building private blockchains).
217 See Giulio Prisco, Blythe Masters and Wall Street Opt for 'Pernissioned' Non-Bitcoin
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blockchains try to demonstrate just how serious and pragmatic they
are by highlighting support for the technology among high-level gov-
ernment officials and business leaders. 218 The two groups are actually
talking about very different phenomena-and scholarly work should
illuminate that tension, rather than trying to downplay it in the name
of preserving unity in the blockchain community.
When De Filippi and Hassan speak of the "incorporation of legal
rules into code" and "regulation by code," culminating in a "reliance
on code not only to enforce legal rules, but also to draft and elaborate
these rules," they do not present these phenomena as unalloyed
goods.219 Rather, they are cautious about the "prospect of automated
legal governance" because it may "reduce the freedoms and auton-
omy of individuals." 220 The answer to these concerns is not to double
down on the translation of legal rules into code. Rather, the preserva-
tion of human control over legal systems will require an alternative
paradigm-a vision of software as a tool to assist persons, rather than
a machine replacing them. Nor should policymakers abandon long-
standing principles of financial regulation to make way for forms of
financial automation that have yet to be proven. There is little evi-
dence that regulation means their "revolutionary promise" would be
lost, as it was probably never there in the first place. 22 1
Blockchains, Brrcomi MAG. (Sept. 2, 2015, 5:03 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.comlarticles/
blythe-masters-wall-street-opt-permissioned-non-bitcoin-blockchains-1441227797 [https://perma.
cc/LWH3-HE4A] (reporting that permissioned blockchains are attractive to companies because
they offer "a completely known universe of transaction processors" and that many financial
institutions are working to create private blockchains rather than relying on the Bitcoin
blockchain).
218 See, e.g., Theo Douglas, Blockchain a 'Next Big Transformational Technology' in Gov-
ernment, GovTECH (May 16, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/security/Blockchain-a-Next-Big-
Transformational-Technology-in-Government.html [https://perma.cc/SLC6-962M].
219 Primavera De Filippi & Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory Tech-
nology: From Code Is Law to Law Is Code, 21 FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 5, 2016), http://
firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/7113/5657#author [https://perma.cc/TW3Z-JZH6];
see also Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the
Rise of Lex Cryptographia, SSRN (Mar. 10, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmab-
stractid=2580664 [https://perma.cc/H29H-WOMM].
220 See Filippi & Hassan, supra note 219, at 11.
221 See ADANI GREENFIELD, RADICAL TECHNOLOGIEs 303 (2017) ("[T]he inventors of the
blockchain overtly intended to erode statism and central administration. Virtually everywhere,
decision algorithms are touted to us on the promise that they will permanently displace human
subjectivity and bias. And yet in every instance we find that these ambitions are flouted, as the
technologies that were supposed to enact them are captured and recuperated by existing concen-
trations of power.").
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III. PROMOTING COMPLEMENTARY AUTOMATION IN LAW
For many legal futurists, substitutive automation-the rise of
robot lawyers to replace current associates and partners-is the long-
term goal of legal technology. 2 2 2 They see early advances in this direc-
tion-such as a chatbot to dispute parking tickets-as part of a gen-
eral trend toward a "rise of the robots" in the 21st-century political
economy.223 This technologically determined narrative of progress re-
flects a larger movement among economists and engineers to cast
human labor itself as a thing of the past, ideally replaced by a full
automation of present jobs. 2 24 But this is just one vision of human pro-
gress-and not a very attractive one. 225
The legal futurists' partial vision of economic progress reflects a
similarly incomplete normative account of the rule of law-one that
asks both too much and too little of legal institutions. Whatever other
normative goals judges and regulators pursue, they should adhere to
the rule of law. Richard Fallon has observed that there are at least
three distinct ideal-typical accounts of the rule of law in contemporary
jurisprudence. 226 Legal automators tend to focus on historicist ac-
counts (which associate the rule of law with "rule by norms laid down
by legitimate lawmaking authorities prior to their application to par-
ticular cases") and formalism (which defines "the ideal if not neces-
sary form of 'law' [as] that of a 'rule,' conceived as a clear prescription
that exists prior to its application and that determines appropriate
conduct or legal outcomes").227 Were federal health-privacy regulation
really reducible to "requirements extraction" encoded in software,
that encoding would amount to a real advance for the rule of law, in
222 See Paul F. Kirgis, The Knowledge Guild: The Legal Profession in an Age of Technologi-
cal Change, 11 NEv. L.J. 184, 184 (2010) (reviewing SussiNo, supra note 132) ("Susskind offers
no evidence to support his claim that greater automation of legal work will result in less demand
for human legal services. In fact, the evidence suggests that productivity increases in knowledge
industries increase demand for those knowledge goods.").
223 See MARTrN FORD, RISE OF THE Ronos 1-27 (2015).
224 See RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRIrUAL MACHINEs 2-4 (2000); see also NicK SR-
NICEK & ALEX WILLIAMS, INVENTING THE FuruRE: POSTcAPrrALIsM AND A WORLD WrrHOUT
WORK 2-3 (2015).
225 See Frank Pasquale, Two Concepts of Immortality: Reframing Public Debate on Stem-
Cell Research, 14 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 73, 75-76 (2002) (critiquing the "downloading" of mem-
ory, intellect, and will onto hardware or software).
226 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (describing these "ideal types . . . as (i) historicist, (ii) formalist,
(iii) Legal Process, and (iv) substantive"). For our purposes, the concrete requirements of the
substantive approach are not relevant; the first three suffice to demonstrate the diversity of con-
ceptions of the rule of law, which demonstrate the legal futurists' partiality.
227 Id. at 11, 14.
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its historicist and formalist conceptions. The law would be as execut-
able as a software command. Similarly, the translation of traffic rules
into a series of chatbot prompts renders the law into a crystalline
form-if not application.
Nevertheless, there is another account of the rule of law, a "Legal
Process conception," which is more expansive, and more recently de-
veloped, than either the historicist or formalist accounts. 2 28 As Fallon
explains,
Legal Process conceptions find the requisites of "law" neces-
sary for the Rule of Law to be satisfied by a mixture of
(i) procedural fairness in the development and application of
legal norms, (ii) an (assumed) internal connection between
notions of law and reasonableness, (iii) reasoned elaboration
of the connection between recognized, pre-existing sources
of legal authority and the determination of rights and re-
sponsibilities in particular cases, and (iv) judicial review as a
guarantor of procedural fairness and rational deliberation by
legislative, executive, and administrative decisionmakers. 229
This elaborate definition may seem awkward in comparison with
the relatively compact accounts of the historicist and formalist
schools. While those approaches emphasize the "rule" side of the rule
of law, the Legal Process approach emphasizes "law" as its core com-
ponent. Law as a social institution is multifaceted and embedded in
particular political systems and traditions, such as rights to appeal and
explanations for decisions. To the extent a legal technology like a
smart contract reduces a legal relationship to a "clear prescription that
exists prior to its application and that determines appropriate conduct
or legal outcomes" (exemplifying the formalist conception of the rule
of law), it is unlikely to meet the complex standards of review and
appeal embodied in the Legal Process conception of the rule of law.23 0
When conflicts over interpretation arise, the Legal Process ap-
proach to the rule of law demands the clashing parties are offered
228 Id. at 18. The term Legal Process here denotes the approach of a school of jurispru-
dence that emerged in the mid-20th century United States in order to reconcile realist and for-
malist approaches to interpretation. See Donald A. Dripps, Justice Harlan on Criminal
Procedure: Two Cheers for the Legal Process School, 3 Omo ST. J. CRIM. L. 125, 126 (2005); see
also LAURA KALmAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 20 (1996) (describing
emergence of the Legal Process school).
229 See Fallon, supra note 226, at 18 (footnotes omitted). Fallon's list of aspects of Legal
Process conceptions of the rule of law is drawn from the locus classicus of the Legal Process
approach. Id. (citing HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 4-5,
152-53, 157-58, 695 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)).
230 Id. at 14, 18.
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"reasoned elaboration of the connection between recognized, pre-ex-
isting sources of legal authority and the determination of rights and
responsibilities in particular cases"-not simple disposition of their
cases via code. 2 3 1 Nor do ad hoc interventions, like those pursued after
The DAO hack discussed above, guarantee the "procedural fairness
and rational deliberation" contemplated by a Legal Process concep-
tion of the rule of law.232 One-sided deployments of vastly superior
legal-technological resources also undermine the types of dialogue
and fair play valued by the Legal Process school.
Fallon has called for the integration of the many strands of mean-
ing in "the Rule of Law" tradition into a robust hybrid theory that
reflects the strengths of each. 2 3 3 Inspired by his approach, this Part
develops principles to guide the future of legal automation in a way
that cultivates and develops, rather than discounts and devalues, attor-
neys' skills.
A. Intelligence Augmentation as Regulative Ideal
The right tools make a job far easier-and even engaging. For
example, a truck driver may find that cruise control frees his foot from
the gas pedal for time to stretch and relieve cramps.234 Automatic
transmission makes it easier to shift from high to low gear.235 Colision
avoidance software can warn him about cars in his blind spot. 2 3 6 Tech-
nology can make the job much easier-until it replaces the driver alto-
gether.2 3 7 There may be a delicate balance between inventions that
help a worker, and those which replace the worker altogether. Never-
theless, economists recognize this distinction as fundamental to valua-
tion, calling the former a complement to labor, and the latter a
substitute for it.238
In computing, Al research has focused on technologies that can
substitute for human cognition and attention. 2 39 For example, even in
the 1960s, roboticists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
231 Id. at 18.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 54-55.
234 Cf NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIc SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., FEDERAL Au-
TOMATED VEHICLES POLICY 9 (2016) (describing the Society of Automotive Engineers ("SAE")




238 See, e.g., BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 21, at 120 (describing complements and
substitutes).
239 JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LOVING GRACE, at xii (2015).
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were developing mechanical sentries to relieve soldiers of the boring
and dangerous duty of standing guard at vulnerable sites.2 4 0 But there
is another way of thinking of the sentry robot-not as Al replacing
troops, but as one more tool to increase their effectiveness. Rather
than viewing its infantry or guards as mere drones to be dispatched as
quickly as a new tool mimics a critical mass of their functions, a mili-
tary may invest in its personnel as skilled operators of increasingly
sophisticated machines. Sensors and computers may be designed to
act as a second set of eyes and ears, rapidly processing threat levels
and other data to better inform soldiers' actions. This is a type of intel-
ligence augmentation ("IA"), which has informed far more projects
than AI.2 4 1
The friendly rivalry between Al and IA researchers casts a new
light on policy debates over the future of automation in law. Software
is frequently unable to provide the full array of services and protec-
tions offered by attorneys. 2 4 2 Nevertheless, federal policymakers have
recently menaced states that attempt to enforce clear distinctions be-
tween automated legal advice and direct counsel from an attorney.
For example, when North Carolina attempted to modernize its regula-
tion of software-based legal services, the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") and Department of Justice ("DOJ") weighed in to criticize
the state and threaten antitrust action against it.243 Framed as an at-
tack on attorney self-protection, the agencies' intervention had flimsy
foundations in economic policy and evidenced little to no awareness
of literature on the pitfalls of automation. 2 44 They appear committed
to promoting software as a substitute for attorneys, even though the
240 Id. at 4.
241 Id. at 23-24.
242 See Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal Ser-
vices, 2015 MIcH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1826 (2015) (describing how premature disruptions occur
when "an industry has experienced a diminution in its capacity or willingness to meet demand
for a core function at pre-disruption levels of quality, leading to a reduction in welfare that
exceeds the benefits brought by the innovation," and applying this theory of premature disrup-
tion to legal services (footnotes omitted)).
243 See Letter from Marina Lao, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm'n &




244 See Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism: Reappraising
Occupational Licensure and Competition Policy, 14 A. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 309, 315 (2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2881732 [https://perma.cc/VYC6-HKEH]
(criticizing the FTC for failing to take into account important consumer protection goals in its
complaints about occupational-licensure restrictions).
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sellers of such software often foist exculpatory clauses (or other limi-
tations of liability) on end users.245 Such clauses prematurely extin-
guish litigation over bad outcomes that could help both attorneys and
consumers better understand the risks involved in Al approaches to
law.2 4 6 At the very least, federal antitrust policymakers should pro-
mote state bans on such clauses, in order to provide a more level play-
ing field in the legal services market.
Computer science researchers should also be more open to view-
ing the indeterminacy and flexibility of law as features best handled by
human (rather than algorithmic) approaches. In early iterations of ex-
pert systems, programmers attempted to translate the rules governing
professionals' demonstrations of expertise into pseudocode, and then
into software. 247 There were some successes in law, but the expert sys-
tem approach never became widespread. In both transactional and lit-
igation contexts, it was almost impossible for any truly knowledgeable
professional to boil down the sum total of their knowledge and judg-
ment into a series of propositions applicable by machine. 2 4 8 This resis-
tance of human know-how to codification and standardization persists
in many contexts far less complex than legal practice is today.249 For
example, the economist David Autor argues that even in the next dec-
ade or so, it is highly unlikely that the replacement of a windshield on
a car could be fully automated, even if driving the car is.2so
245 See, e.g., Act of June 30, 2016, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 60 (2016 North Carolina law ex-
empting certain website providers from the definition of the "practice of law" and creating addi-
tional requirements for website providers).
246 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 139-40 (2013) (describing suboptimal so-
cial outcomes arising out of exculpatory clauses).
247 See HUBERT L. DREYFUs, STUART E. DREYFus & TOM ATHANASIOU, MIND OVER MA-
CHINE 6 (1986).
248 See id. at 11 ("Problems involving deep understanding built up on the basis of vast
experience will not yield-as do simple, well-defined problems that exist in isolation from much
of human experience-to formal mathematical or computer analysis."); id. at 81 ("[T]he sheer
number of lawyers in business tells us that it is impossible to banish ambiguity and judgment by
specifying a code of law so complete that all situations are specified and prejudged.").
249 David H. Autor, Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Work-
place Automation, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2015).
250 See David Autor, Polanyi's Paradox and the Shape of Employment Growth 31 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 20485, Sept. 2014) ("Modem automobile plants,
for example, employ industrial robots to install windshields on new vehicles as they move
through the assembly line. But aftermarket windshield replacement companies employ techni-
cians, not robots, to install replacement windshields. Why not robots? Because removing a bro-
ken windshield, preparing the windshield frame to accept a replacement, and fitting a
replacement into that frame demand far more real-time adaptability than any contemporary
robot can approach.").
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B. Preserving Articulable Standards in an Age of Rules and Brute-
Force Prediction
The appeal of pervasive legal automation is based on a certain
conception of the rule of law and of a legal duty to pursue a type of
utility maximization. Many critics of courts complain that judges sim-
ply list multiple factors to consider, and then offer some gestalt opin-
ion without properly distinguishing contrary authority or otherwise
reasoning from first principles to a decision.251 The obvious reform
response within the law is to try to develop some kind of rule to make
clear what decisions should be based on. So, for instance, after Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,252 a leading case on the "in-
dependent contractor/employee" distinction in copyright law, many
law review articles tried to isolate payment of payroll taxes as the
touchstone, despite the multifactor test in the case. 253 More ambitious
articles might try to explain variations with elaborate subrules, as trea-
tise writers are prone to typologize cases.254
Despite the ambitions of the systematizers, there are almost al-
ways conflicts among the approaches of multiple courts to similar sets
of facts, irreconcilable by logic or reason. For partisans of predictive
analytics in law, when there is no real rule of decision integrating fac-
tors in a reasoned way, the methods of natural language processing
may take aspects of past cases (such as the filings), model the effects
of various phrases or structures of the documents on the deci-
sionmaker, and then extrapolate those effects in future cases on the
basis of their filings.
To the extent it applies these methods as the optimal way of
bringing order to a confusing area of law, the best way a firm can
251 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion out of "Likelihood of Confusion": To-
ward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 1307, 1308
(2012) ("These multifactor tests are deeply flawed. They support an open-ended and relatively
subjective approach that generates serious litigation uncertainty, chills beneficial uses of marks,
and supports socially problematic expansions of trademark law."); William McGeveran, Rethink-
ing Trademark Fair Use, 94 IowA L. Rav. 49, 67-68 (2008) ("[Mlost trademark infringement
cases turn on the application of a complex multifactor test.... Unfortunately, this approach is
both unpredictable and time-consuming."); Meredith Hayward, Reasonable Notice Periods Still
Not "One Size Fits All," LrrlGATOR (Mar. 1, 2011) http://www.thelitigator.ca/2011/03/reasonable-
notice-periods-still-not-one-size-fits-all/ [https://perma.cc/W3ZT-6VBD].
252 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) ("In determining whether a hired party is an employee
under the general common law of agency, we consider [over 10 factors]. No one of these factors
is determinative." (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
253 See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Copyright Law: Toward an Improved "Works for Hire" Doc-
trine, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557, 572-76 (1991).
254 See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHrT § 5:53 (2016); 1 HowARD B. ABRAMS,
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHir § 4:9 (2017).
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advise clients is to have as many fact situations in its database as possi-
ble, match their facts to all the extant facts, and perform brute predic-
tions of what the judges will do. This form of prediction is much like
weather forecasters using big data (rather than underlying atmos-
pheric dynamics) to predict the movement of storms.25 5 An al-
gorithmic analysis of a database of, say, 1,000 cold fronts with a given
atmospheric pressure sweeping over Michigan may, with proper pa-
rameters and algorithms, prove a better predictor of the next cold
front's effects than a trained meteorologist without access to such a
data trove.2 5 6
These methods also mirror advances in translation accomplished
by Google over the past decade. Google Translate does not deploy
some hierarchical set of rules to convert a word or phrase or sentence
from one language to another. 2 5 7 Rather, it simply tries to match the
phrase to be converted to an identical or similar phrase in an instant,
translated document, and then find the matching phrase in the transla-
tion of that document to use it in the target context. 258 Google's trans-
lation program is not parsing the meaning of the words it translates.
Rather, it is indexing past human translations and matching them to
current targets.2 5 9 In harder translations, it may well be extrapolating
how best to meld divergent translations-but it relies on human re-
sponses to determine which are better, or worse, translations. 2 60
Far from being conflicting approaches to automating legal analy-
sis, expert systems and machine learning approaches based on predic-
255 This may either exemplify or solve Bentham's complaints about overcomplexity of law.
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 11-15 (2015); see also What's Reasonable?,
BARDAL FACTORS, http://www.bardalfactors.calwhats-reasonable/ [https://perma.cc/FHT8-
B6RD]; cf Samuel Gibbs, supra note 67.
256 See PHAEDRA DAIPHA, MASTERS OF UNCERTAINTY 51 (2015) (describing the project of
"employing the brute force of computers to mathematically simulate the laws of atmospheric
physics").
257 See Alex Chitu, How Google Translate Works, GOOGLE OPERATING SYs. (Aug. 12,
2010, 12:59 AM), http://googlesystem.blogspot.com/2010/08/how-google-translate-works.html
[https://perma.cc/7RYC-7M3R].
258 See id.; see also DAVID BELLOS, Is THAT A FISH IN YOUR EAR? 255 (2011); Tomas
Mikolov et al., Distributed Representations of Words and Phrases and Their Compositionality,
2013 ADVANCES NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING Sys. 3111-19, https://papers.nips.cc/paper/5021-dis
tributed-representations-of-words-and-phrases-and-their-compositionality.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DH9T-GFA5] (describing the use of language vectors to improve Google Translate).
259 See Google Translate Community FAQ, GOOGLE, https://docs.google.comldocument/d/
ldwS4CZzgZwmvoB9pAx4A6Yytmv7itkXE968RMiqpMY/pub [https://perma.cc/3DQ4-
YME8].
260 See id. ("While Google Translate is a statistical machine translation tool . . . , we some-
times need help from native speakers to improve our algorithms . . . .").
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tive analytics are deeply complementary methods of advancing
substitutive automation in law. Once predictive analysts take a distant
reading of cases,261 treating the decisionmaker as a black box that
takes in inputs (fact patterns) and generates outputs (judgments), with
little clear sense of how input turned into output, there is pressure to
formalize the system. 26 2 Persons rightly demand some sense of why an
outcome occurred. But the more formalized law becomes, the easier it
is to convert its rules to the types of expert systems deployed in a
program like TurboTax.
Thus, legal-automation software may have an advantage over
human attorneys in extreme scenarios. If law in an area is utterly inde-
terminate, algorithmic analyses may find patterns in cases beyond
human comprehension and successfully brute force a prediction of
likely legal outcomes.263 If the law, by contrast, is perfectly ordered, an
expert system can reduce it to a series of rules to be applied. 264 Fortu-
nately for human attorneys, most living areas of law fit neither
description-nor should they. Between the crystalline clarity of rules
and the chaos of unconstrained discretion, there are articulable stan-
dards that help us formulate convincing explanations and justifications
of legal decisionmaking, without foreordaining outcomes in advance.
Businesses may complain about courts or agencies failing to
articulate a clear rule for applying a statute before a complaint or en-
forcement action is lodged against them.265 But this battle was lost in
the 1940s. 2 6 6 As the Supreme Court decided in SEC v. Chenery
261 See FRANco MORETTI, DISTANT READING 32 (2013) (describing an alternative to tex-
tual hermeneutics, which relies on the aggregation of data from hundreds or thousands of texts).
262 See Casey & Niblett, supra note 14; see also Katz, supra note 12, at 936-47.
263 Even in this scenario, though, hard ethical questions arise about the potential use of
such programs. See Pasquale & Cashwell, Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Beha-
viorirsm, supra note 2, at 81 ("[T]he pragmatic and the critical uses of predictive algorithms [in
law] are in tension. An analyst may reveal biases in judgments, such as legally irrelevant details
that somehow seem to be correlated with, and perhaps even driving, decisions. The same analyst
may sell the predictive tool to attorneys or courts as a case selection or triage tool. But precisely
to the extent that past training data reflect bias, they are likely to reinforce and spread the
influence of that bias when they are used by actors outside the judicial system (who may, for
example, not even try to advocate for a particular class of meritorious cases since decision mak-
ers are systematically biased against them).").
264 It is also important to acknowledge, however, that the process of articulating a rule may
not improve decisionmaking. See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the
Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1286 (2008).
265 See Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule-Following Argument, CAN. J.L. & JuRIs., July
1990, at 187-188.
266 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) ("Not every principle
essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the
mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be
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Corp. ,267 "There is ... a very definite place for the case-by-case evolu-
tion of statutory standards." 2 6 8 A humane legal order, flexibly adapt-
ing to new realities and political change, demands nothing less.
Even weather forecasting-an exemplar of so much of the predic-
tive modeling that motivates efforts to automate law-has recognized
the ineradicable importance of human judgment, as sociologist Phae-
dra Daipha observes:
The official [National Weather Service ("NWS")] rheto-
ric . . . is replete with reductionist language and technocratic
buzzwords, while forecasters readily subscribe to a naively
positivist vision of science-even when, or precisely because,
they keep an ironic distance from it. On the other hand,
NWS operational guidelines explicitly and repeatedly leave it
to forecasters' judgment and discretion how numerical pre-
diction models may assist them in their task.2 69
Even in meteorology, judgment is essential. And unlike judges or reg-
ulators, meteorologists have no recognizable duties to understand par-
ties' interests and arguments, and no worries about potential tensions
between doing justice in a particular case and setting optimal prece-
dent for future cases. The case for discretion among human deci-
sionmakers-and, by extension, in the forms of legal practice
deployed by those advocating before them-is far stronger in law than
it is in meteorology.
Flexibility is especially important for agencies regulating fast-
moving fields.270 It will, of necessity, "break" both the brute-force pre-
diction models and the expert systems models of devotees of artificial
intelligence in law. That is a feature, not a bug, of judicial and agency
adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in
these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general
rule or by individual order.").
267 Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
268 Id. at 202-03 ("In other words, problems may arise in a case which the administrative
agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a
relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular
problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem
may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries
of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on
a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There is thus a very definite
place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And the choice made between pro-
ceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the in-
formed discretion of the administrative agency.").
269 DAIPHA, supra note 256, at 52 (citations omitted).
270 See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protec-
tion, 83 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 2230, 2233-34 (2015).
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discretion. Many past efforts to rationalize and algorithmatize the law
have failed, for good reason: there is no way to fairly extrapolate the
thought processes of some body of past decisionmaking to all new sce-
narios. For example, the introduction of a "grid" of preprogrammed
factors in social security disability determinations could easily have
been understood as a prelude to automation of such decisions. 2 7 1 But
very quickly forms of discretion started entering into the grid to do
justice to the infinite variety of factual scenarios presented by sick and
disabled claimants. 2 7 2
This is not to discount entirely the deployment of artificial intelli-
gence in law. Brute-force predictors may help advise clients as crystal-
line rules turn into muddy standards, and vice versa.2 7 3 They can also
alert decisionmakers when biases begin to emerge. 2 7 4 For example, a
notable study in behavioral economics recently exposed judges ac-
cepting more parole requests after lunch than before it.275 Ideally,
such studies do not inspire predictive-analytics firms to find other ex-
traneous influences on decisionmaking and to advise clients on how to
take advantage of them (by, for example, sending tall attorneys to ad-
vocate before judges revealed to be partial to tall advocates). Rather,
this disturbing finding is better framed as a prompt to judges to start
developing ways of guarding against this hunger bias once they are
alerted to it (or, failing that, to snack regularly).27 6 Other profession-
271 See Jack B. Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security Disability Cases in the Fed-
eral Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897, 906-07 (1984).
272 See BERNARD WIXON & ALEXANDER STRAND, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, &
STATISTICS, Soc. SEC. ADMIN., No. 2013-01, IDENTIFYING SSA's SEQUENTIAL DISABILITY DE-
TERMINATION STEPs USING ADMINISTRATIvE DATA 2,6 (2013), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/
rsnotes/rsn2Ol3-01.html [https://perma.cc/Z9ST-G6ABI ("Beginning in 1999, [the Social Security
Administration] implemented modifications to the disability determination procedures in states
known as prototype states. One modification was to allow [Disability Determination Service]
decision makers the discretion to proceed directly to step 5 when there is insufficient evidence
about the claimant's work history to make the evaluation at step 4." (footnotes omitted)).
273 See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578-80
(1988).
274 See Julia Angwin et al., supra note 65 (discussing Northpointe recidivism scoring and
the biases of judges making decisions without such a system); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (using empirical data on bias in peremptory sentencing); Donald G. Gifford
& Brian Jones, Keeping Cases from Black Juries: An Empirical Analysis of How Race, Income
Inequality, and Regional History Affect Tort Law, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 557, 564-65 (2016).
275 Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCI. U.S. AM. 6889, 6890 (2011) (finding that the "likelihood of a favorable ruling is greater at
the very beginning of the work day or after a food break than later in the sequence of cases").
276 See David Golumbia, Judging Like a Machine, in PoSTDIGrrAL AESTHETICS 123, 133-34
(David M. Berry & Michael Dieter eds., 2015) ("As attractive as it may be to allow more and
more of our world to be judged by machines, we must take very seriously the idea that human
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als, like physicians and pharmacists, routinely utilize automated
alarms as "guard rails" to warn against potentially wrong decisions. 2 77
Such decision-support tools are not a replacement of the human with
the algorithmic, but rather another step toward improving a soci-
otechnical system of human decisionmakers and machine-aided deci-
sion analysis.278
CONCLUSION
The automation of a field as complex as law can lead to perverse
consequences. Billed as a way of streamlining legal services, artificial
intelligence can easily distort or subvert the purposes it is meant to
support. Standardized legal forms may betray the objectives of the
customer they ostensibly serve. Software can radically simplify com-
pliance efforts, but when it does so by downplaying, trivializing, or
ignoring important aspects of the language of law, it is a betrayal of
the rule of law-not its translation into code.
Despite all these problems, many of which remain either un-
resolved or inadequately addressed, legal futurists continue to pro-
mote the acceleration of automation in law. 2 7 9 As clients, bar
associations, and legislators debate how far to permit software to sub-
stitute for legal counsel and advocacy, they should keep several
themes of this Article in mind.
Both humble and ambitious versions of substitutive legal automa-
tion have stalled or failed to fully realize their announced ambitions. 2 8 0
The legal profession should pursue an alternative paradigm-a com-
plementary vision of human-machine cooperation. Known as intelli-
gence augmentation, this pragmatic approach motivated far more
judgement, though it be systematically flawed, is nevertheless the only responsible form for
human power to take.").
277 See M. Susan Ridgley & Michael D. Greenberg, Too Many Alerts, Too Much Liability:
Sorting Through the Malpractice Implications of Drug-Drug Interaction Clinical Decision Sup-
port, 5 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 257, 258-61, 279 (2012) (describing promise of
decision support systems and the need for judgment in the face of excessive alerts).
278 See Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 45, 47-48 (2015).
279 See, e.g., SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 7, at 68; John 0. McGinnis, Accelerating AI,
104 Nw. L. REV. 366, 368 (2010). But see Frank Pasquale, Automating the Professions: Utopian
Pipe Dream or Dystopian Nightmare?, L.A. REV. BOOKS, (Mar. 15, 2016) (reviewing SussKiND
& SUSSKIND, supra note 7), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/automating-the-professions-uto-
pian-pipe-dream-or-dystopian-nightmare/ [https://perma.cc/6DRC-AQLK].
280 This problem is not limited to law. Concerns over "fake news" in the 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election showed the pervasiveness of the problem. See, e.g., Frank A. Pasquale, The Au-
tomated Public Sphere, in THE POLITICS AND POLICIES OF BiG DATA (Ann Rudinow Sxtnan,
Ingrid Schneider & Nicola Green eds., 2018) (describing the pervasiveness and effect of fake
news in automated environments).
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advances in computing over the past half-century than dreams of gen-
eral artificial intelligence. 2 8 1 Complementary automation enables
human attorneys, and other workers in the legal profession, to do jus-
tice to the complexity and subtlety of language.
Those working in the field of legal technology should be careful
to avoid conflating attorneys' professional role with the delivery of
expertise. The rule of law entails a system of social relationships and
legitimate governance, not simply the transfer and evaluation of infor-
mation about behavior. There is necessarily some degree of self-gov-
ernance among professionals, which gives them an occupational
identity distinct from other workers. Their primary fiduciary duty is to
clients, not managers or shareholders. The main reason they enjoy this
autonomy is because they must handle intractable conflicts of values
that repeatedly require thoughtful discretion and negotiation. A ro-
bust and ethical legal profession respects that discretion, founded on
the flexibility and subtlety of legal language, as a prerequisite for a
just and accountable social order. It ensures a rule of persons, not
machines.
281 See JOHN MARKOFF, MACHINES OF LovING GRACE 1-20 (2015) (describing history of
computer science research); DANIEL CREVIER, Al 209 (1993) (describing the AI winter of the
1980s and the failures of substitutive expert systems).
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